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CONTRACT AS A TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP
PETER BENSON*
All agree that contracts are, and must be, voluntary transactions,
in this way differing from transactions that come under the law of
tort or unjust enrichment. Unless an agreement is voluntary on both
sides, it cannot be binding and so cannot be a contract at all.
Voluntary interaction is the essential basis of obligation in contract.
Understanding the voluntary character of contract would therefore
seem crucial to clarifying its moral basis as well as its distinctive
place within private law. But what makes an agreement voluntary?
Most would root the voluntariness of contract in the fact that it
arises through the parties' consent. Contract is essentially consensual and in virtue of this it is voluntary. So, for example, Samuel
Pufendorf begins his classic discussion On the Consent Required in
Promisesand Pacts with the proposition, which he presents as selfevident, that
no more pertinent reason can be advanced, whereby a man can
be prevented from complaining hereafter of having to carry such
a burden [of the necessity of doing something] than that he
agreed to it of his own accord, and sought on his own judgement
what he had full power to refuse.'
The question is what, if any, conception of consent can function as
the essential basis of contractual obligation. I have put the question
this way because what we are seeking is a unified and coherent
moral basis for contract. It is the central question that I address.
The legal point of view itself supposes that a certain sort of
consent is pertinent to contract law. We begin with this, because our
aim is to elucidate and to justify a conception of consent that is at
* I would like to thank my Research Assistant Fredrick Schumann for helpful comments
and suggestions.
1. 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 402 (C.H. Oldfather &
W.A. Oldfather trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1688) (footnote omitted).
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least implicit in the widely recognized principles of contract law and
so part of our public reason.
Now the sort of consent that is supposed by contract law is one
that is necessary and sufficient for contract formation and therefore
for the establishment of a relation of right and duty between the
parties at the moment of agreement. The relation of right and duty
arises through the parties' mutual expressions of assent, prior to
and independent of the moment of performance. From a legal point
of view, no new rights or duties arise between the parties after
formation, whether by performance or by breach. The contractual
rights and duties between the parties are completely specified and
determined at formation. Performance adds nothing new but is
just the fulfillment of the rights and duties established at contract
formation. More precisely, performance respects those rights
whereas breach injures them. The character and shape of these
rights is reflected in the fact that they are specified only as between
the parties, not against others who are strangers to the contract,
and that their breach is remedied through damages or specific
performance, both of which aim to put the plaintiff in the position
he or she would have been in had the defendant performed as
promised. The law supposes that these remedies are necessary and
sufficient to enforce, by way of compensation, the rights and duties
that are brought into existence by the parties' consents at contract
formation. All this seems relatively clear and uncontroversial. To
see that it is not, I turn to the celebrated essay by Fuller and
Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages.2
I. THE FULLER AND PERDUE CHALLENGE

In their article, Fuller and Perdue begin with the long-established
legal principle that the normal remedy for breach of contract is
either expectation damages or specific performance and that in
giving such remedy, the law aims to put the plaintiff in the position
he or she would have been in had the contract been performed.3
2. The essay was published in two parts. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The
Reliance Interest in ContractDamages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936); L.L. Fuller & William R.
Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937). All
citations in this Essay to "Fuller & Perdue" refer to the first part of their work.
3. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 2, at 52 n.1 (quoting 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1338
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The law takes this "expectation" principle to be a principle of
compensation and, as such, to be a just and ruling principle.4 This
is precisely what Fuller and Perdue challenge. They write that
contract remedies give a plaintiff "something he never had."5 'This,"
they point out, "seems on the face of things a queer kind of 'compensation."'6 In giving such remedies, the law does not "heal a disturbed
status quo" but instead brings into being "a new situation" and, in
doing so, the law passes "from the realm of corrective justice to that
of distributive justice. 7
Their challenge supposes, then, the generally accepted idea of
compensation in private law and urges that the central and
distinctive remedies of contract law do not fit with this idea,
contrary to the way the law presents them. What is this idea of
compensation?
Briefly, it supposes, at step one, an initial baseline that represents a legally protected interest which the plaintiff has exclusive
as against the defendant, prior to the defendant's wrong. The
plaintiff must have something as a matter of exclusive right which
the defendant is not permitted to injure. Absent this interest, any
impact which the defendant's conduct may have on the plaintiffs
well-being will be no more than damnum absque injuria.Supposing
now, at step two, the defendant does something that is incompatible
with the plaintiffs protected interest-the law will attempt by way
of remedy, at step three, to reinstate the plaintiff in the position he
or she would have been had the defendant respected his right.
Damages are given, not to increase the plaintiff's well-being which
has been diminished, but to cancel the wrong by repairing the loss
that results from it. So far as money damages can do, the plaintiff
is put into the position he or she would have been had there been no
wrong. This position is the initial baseline. It is only if the rationalization of the remedy begins and ends with this baseline of protected
interest that it can count as compensatory. In the particular case of
(1920)).
4. A typical statement of this view is the classic version by Lord Atkinson in Wertheim
v. ChicoutimiPulp Co., [1911] A.C. 301, 307 (P.C. 1910) (appeal taken from Que.). Fuller and
Perdue cite Williston's statement of the principle. Fuller & Perdue, supranote 2, at 52.
5. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 2, at 53.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 56.
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contract remedies, if expectation damages and specific performance
are to qualify as compensatory, it must be possible to view them as
reinstating plaintiffs in something which is their protected interest
and which they already have prior to breach. But this is exactly
what Fuller and Perdue deny.
Fuller and Perdue then go on to consider a number of possible
non-compensatory justifications for the expectation rule and
conclude that the most plausible basis is a rationale that views
these remedies as curing and preventing a plaintiffs reliance losses
as well as facilitating general reliance on business agreements." In
this Essay, I do not wish to discuss their suggested rationale.9
Instead, I want to make more explicit their reason for holding that
the expectation remedy, whether damages or specific performance,
cannot be understood as compensation. This will enable us to see
more clearly how contract formation must be conceived if, contra
Fuller and Perdue, the legal point of view is to be plausible and
further, what kind of consent might be the necessary and sufficient
basis of contractual obligation.
The premise for their conclusion, although implicit, seems clear.
Fuller and Perdue presuppose a conception of promising in which
the making of a promise does not, in and of itself, give the promisee
anything that, as a matter of rights and prior to performance, can
count as a protected interest as against the promisor. The assumption here is that it is only if and when performance takes place that
the promisee acquires anything that qualifies as a legally protected
interest. Thus a breach of contract cannot, strictly speaking, count
as an injury that interferes with, or otherwise deprives the promisee
of, something he acquires at contract formation." Nothing is
acquired at contract formation. At the start, certainly the promisor
8. Id. at 57-66.
9. I have discussed the Fuller and Perdue article in more detail in previous articles. Most
recently, see Peter Benson, Contract, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 24, 25-29 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996); Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in
THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 118, 119-22 (Peter Benson ed., 2001)
[hereinafter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law]; and Peter Benson, The Expectation and
Reliance Interests in Contract Theory: A Reply to Fuller and Perdue, ISSUES LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP, June 2001, http://www.bepress.com/ils/issl/art5.
10. This view is clearly stated by two continental writers, Emile Durkheim and Pierre de
Tourtoulon, in Fuller & Perdue, supra note 2, at 56 n.7. Fuller and Perdue cite Durkheim and
Tourtoulon's views in support of their argument that the expectation remedy is not
compensatory in character.
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may have a property right in, say, the horse that he or she agrees to
sell to the promisee. The promisor's protected interest in the horse
ends or is limited only when he or she delivers it into the promisee's
possession, whereupon it is now the promisee who has the property
right in it as against (in principle) anyone else. What Fuller and
Perdue deny is that the promise as such gives the promisee any
legal entitlement whatsoever. There is no specifically contractual
entitlement.
On this view, property and promises are radically distinguished.
Only property intrinsically and necessarily entails the idea of
exclusive rights as against others. Property, but not promise,
expresses a right of ownership in the large sense of having something of one's own from which one is entitled by rights to exclude
others. If, according to Fuller and Perdue, certain promises should
be enforced, it is not because they are understood as conferring
ownership or creating a relation of exclusive right as between the
parties, but simply and solely because enforcement is desirable on
the basis of policy considerations. They deny that promises, as such,
have juridical significance. 1
This view of promises is in sharp contrast with the legal standpoint. The law presents the kind of rights conferred by enforceable
promises (rights in personam), no less than proprietary rights in
rem, as being exclusive as against another (the promisor) with
respect to something in which the promisee can have a legally
protected interest. Contract rights are clearly viewed as involving
ownership, understood in the large sense. Moreover, this protected
interest is directly established in and by the parties' mutually
related expressions of assent. The source of right here is the parties'
transaction itself. The legal principles governing the requisite
assents-the doctrines of offer and acceptance as well as consideration-do not single out enforceable promises on the basis of their
substantive content, purposes, or economic significance. To the
contrary, the principles of formation are content-neutral and
indifferent to such considerations. A promise of something in
return for another's refraining from an activity he or she is legally
permitted to do, as in the famous case of Hamer v. Sidway,2 has the
11. See id. at 56-57.
12. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891) (involving an uncle's promise to his nephew for a payment of
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same legal standing and significance as the most sophisticated and
commercially important business deal.
Fuller and Perdue's denial of the juridical significance of promises
is troubling because it means that the very basis of the most
distinctive feature of contract law is radically misconceived, despite
the fact that the compensatory character of the expectation remedy
has long been settled and accepted in modern systems of contract
law, both common law and civil law. It becomes questionable when
we notice that, far from arguing for, let alone showing the
necessity of, their view, Fuller and Perdue simply assume it. Even
more interestingly, their denial of a juridical character to promises
undermines their central claim that reliance is, and should be, the
basis of contractual liability. Let me explain.
Fuller and Perdue hold that a promise, without anything more,
creates merely a psychological expectation of performance which
may in fact be fulfilled or disappointed. 3 The expectation, and
therefore its satisfaction or disappointment, does not as such give
rise to any claims of rights between the parties. For breach of
promise to have juridical consequences, something more must be
present. According to Fuller and Perdue, this further necessary
factor is reasonable reliance by the promisee upon the promise. 4
Where a promisee does rely and, upon breach, sustains loss as a
result of such reliance, they contend that damages for such reliance
losses, unlike expectation losses, are compensatory.' 5 However,
given the contrast that Fuller and Perdue draw between property
and promises, this is not self-evident even in their own terms.
To explain, there are two basic ways in which a promisee may
rely to his detriment on another's promise. Both represent a
situation in which the promisee has changed position in reliance on
the promise. In the first, the promisee expends some resource or
incurs a potential burden or liability in reliance on the promise. But
for the promise, the promisee would not have done so. If the
promisor fails to perform, the expenditure may be lost or wasted and
the burden or liability may materialize, causing the promisee loss.
$5000 in exchange for the nephew's refraining from using alcohol and tobacco, swearing, or
gambling until age twenty-one).
13. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 2, at 57-58.
14. Id. at 56.
15. Id.
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A second way in which a promisee can change position in reliance
on another's promise is by foregoing a beneficial opportunity that is
available to him or her and which he or she would take but for the
promise. If the promisor does not perform, the promisee may not be
able to go back to his or her pre-reliance situation because the
opportunity is no longer available, or available only at a greater
cost. This would be his reliance loss.
Notice that in the first case, a promisee no longer has the resource
which has been expended in reliance on the other party's promise;
in the second situation, the promisee never obtains the beneficial
opportunity that, otherwise, he or she would have taken in the
absence of the promise. In other words, at the time the promisor
breaches, the promisee either no longer has or does not yet have any
present proprietary interest that can be injured by the promisor.
Moreover, there is nothing which the promisee physically possesses
or has a present right to possess. However, by the very objection
which Fuller and Perdue raise against the supposed compensatory
character of the expectation remedy, the reliance remedy cannot
itself count as compensatory unless it repairs injury to something
which comes under the promisee's exclusive right as against the
promisor. But if the promisee does not have a proprietary interest,
it is by no means clear, on their argument, how the promisee can
have this right.
To have this right, the plaintiff would have to argue something
like the following:'" because the defendant, by his or her promise,
induces the plaintiff to give up or not obtain something in which
there can be a protected interest, fairness and reasonableness
require that the defendant be estopped from denying the plaintiffs
claim on the ground that he or she lacks a protected interest. In
light of the defendant's promise and the plaintiffs reasonable
reliance thereon, the plaintiff's pre-reliance position represents a
protected baseline which the defendant must not injure through
his or her breach of promise. The plaintiff's pre-reliance position
16. I have discussed this in Peter Benson, The Basis for Excluding Liabilityfor Economic
Loss in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw 450-54 (David G. Owen ed.,
1995) [hereinafter Benson, The Basis for Excluding Liability], and most recently in Peter
Benson, Should White v. Jones Represent Canadian Law: A Return to First Principles, in
EMERGING ISSUES IN TORT LAW (J. Neyers et al. eds., forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Benson,
Should White v. Jones Represent CanadianLaw].
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constitutes a protected baseline only as between the parties and as
a fair implication of their interaction. Notice that here the promise
has juridical consequences as part of a reliance analysis and that,
once again as part of this analysis, the plaintiff asserts a protected
interest which is not proprietary (in rem) but which nevertheless
entails an exclusive right as against the defendant with respect to
a thing (the pre-reliance asset). There is a non-proprietary ownership interest that arises through a transaction constituted by a
promise on one side and reliance on the other side.
We see, then, that the problem of entitlement that Fuller and
Perdue raise against the expectation remedy has wider implications
for their own view. There are two fundamental questions: First, can
there be exclusive rights which, although not proprietary (in rem),
are nevertheless ownership rights because they are exclusive
against another with respect to the control of a thing? Second, is it
possible for such non-proprietary entitlements to arise through
interactionbetween the parties?The compensatory character of reliance damages, no less than expectation damages, rests on explaining how both questions may be answered in the affirmative. In the
particular case of expectation damages, the challenge is to see
whether there can be such entitlements at the moment of contract
formation and therefore fully established solely through the parties'
expressions of mutual assent even in the absence of actual reliance.
The consent that is the moral basis of contract would be that which
is necessary and sufficient to establish such entitlements. To
explain this is the most important task of the theory of contract.
Before attempting to do this in Part III, I want first to consider,
even if briefly, three instructive contemporary efforts to meet the
Fuller and Perdue challenge and to vindicate the expectation
interest. Each of these, I argue, fails because it does not specify a
conception of entitlement for contract that is suitably transactional
and complete at the moment of the parties' consents. Understanding
their deficiencies will clarify what is needed to answer Fuller and
Perdue and thereby to provide a satisfactory theoretical defense of
the possibility of contract.
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II. THREE ANSWERS TO FULLER AND PERDUE: THE THEORIES OF
FRIED, SCANLON, AND GORDLEY

A. Fried
I begin with Charles Fried's account of contract as promise.17
Contractual obligation, he argues, rests on the duty to keep one's
promises and the latter is explained in two steps.'" The first
establishes the rationality of a general convention of promising
that is known by both promisors and promisees to be a means of
communicating present commitment to future performances. This
convention is rational in the sense that it is wanted by and is useful
to individuals in the pursuit of their various ends. Whether as an
expression of generosity or in order to obtain reciprocal benefits,
people wish to be able to give and to obtain in their mutual relations
a secure moral basis with regard to expectations of future conduct.
Otherwise, the range and scope of individual purposes are severely
limited. By invoking the convention, people know that they are
communicating to others-and they know that the others understand this as well-a commitment to do something that would
otherwise have been optional. But what if a promisor, who has
invoked the convention by making a promise to another, comes to
regret his or her decision before performing? Is there a moral basis
distinct from detrimental reliance for saying that the promisor
would wrong the promisee if he or she did not perform?
Fried answers that the mere fact that one has used the convention and made a promise does not explain why it is wrong to break
that promise. The fact that I invoke the convention because I want
to bind myself so that another might expect a future performance
does not, by itself, show that I am now obligated to perform my
promise if to do so would be inconvenient or costly. Fried raises
this problem because, in his view, one must explain how even
17. CHARLES FRIED, CoNTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
(1981). I have discussed Fried's theory in greater detail in Peter Benson, Abstract Right and

the Possibilityof a Non-distributiveConceptionof Contract:Hegel and ContemporaryContract
Theory, 10 CARDoZo L. REv. 1077, 1095-117 (1989), and in Peter Benson, The Idea of a Public
Basis of Justificationfor Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 273, 288-93 (1995) [hereinafter
Benson, PublicBasis of Justification].
18. The following is a summary of his view as set out in Chapter Two of FRIED, supranote
17, 7-27.
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the intentional creation of expectations in another via a general
convention can bind the person to perform. Why does the promisor
owe the promisee this performance? Fried's answer is that there is
a duty to perform because, by invoking the general convention of
promising, a promisor has invited the promisee to trust and to make
himself or herself vulnerable. Breach of promise is an abuse of this
trust.
Fried does not elaborate what he means by trust or by vulnerability, although by his own theoretical claims he must distinguish it
from detrimental reliance in the strict sense. Clearly, the ordinary
idea of trust can mean that the promisee trusts the promisor's
moral integrity and fidelity to perform as promised simply because
this is what the promisor has committed himself or herself to do.
Pufendorf, whom Fried cites as an early defender of the promise
principle, gives an example of promising when trust and vulnerability are expressly invoked by the promisor and appear most clearly:
"I have made up my mind in all seriousness to do this or that for
you, and I hope that you will take my word for it."'9 In this example,
we see that the commitment is established by the promisor's act
alone, without the joint participation of the promisee. The promise
is made to or for, but not with, the promisee. The promisee need not
do anything to bring the commitment into existence. Further, by
making the promise, the promisor does not, then and there, transfer
anything to the promisee which the latter can assert as his or her
own against the promisor prior to performance. To the contrary, the
promisee will only acquire the thing promised if and when performance takes place. Until that moment, the promisee can merely
hope that he or she will receive it, trusting the promisor's honesty
and his or her fidelity to his or her word. It is precisely when the
commitment arises through the promisor's decision alone and the
promisee has not already given the promisee anything prior to
performance that trust and vulnerability are present most clearly
and purely.
In Kantian terms, all that Fried has shown is that the promisor's
duty to perform is a duty of virtue, not a juridical obligation of right.
If the promisor fails to perform as promised, he or she may have
abused the promisee's trust and this is certainly something
19. 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 1, at 394.
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blameworthy. But, in the absence of detrimental reliance, Fried's
argument does not show that the promisor has thereby injured a
legally protected interest belonging to the promisee. Trust and
vulnerability, we have seen, can be generated without presupposing
that the promise gives the promisee, prior to performance, anything
that can count as his or her own as against the promisor. These
grounds of obligation need not arise through the promise vesting the
promisee with a legally protected interest at the moment the
promise is made. Fried writes that "if I make a promise to you, I
should do as I promise; and if I fail to keep my promise, it is fair
that I should be made to hand over the equivalent of the promised
performance."20 But, unless the moral grounds for the obligation
suppose that the promise does give the promisee a legally protected
interest prior to performance, the conclusion that the promisor
should, absent detrimental reliance, be under any legal liability for
damages, let alone for expectation damages, is unsupported. There
is no basis for holding that nonperformance injures anything that
belongs to the promisee and therefore no basis for concluding that
the promisor should be made to hand over the equivalent of the
promised performance as a matter of compensation. The argument
wholly fails to meet the Fuller and Perdue objection.
B. Scanlon
In his recent discussion of promises and contracts, 2 T.M. Scanlon
suggests a different answer to the Fuller and Perdue objection,
which revises Fried's approach in at least three important respects.
First, Scanlon argues that the obligation to perform one's promises
need not depend upon supposing the prior existence of a general
convention of promising or indeed of any convention at all.2" Rather,
it requires only that there be a moral principle that applies directly
to a two-party relation and that articulates a reasonable basis upon
which, as between them, one party should perform as promised.2 3
Scanlon's account-this is the second point of difference--is thus
20. FRIED, supranote 17, at 17.
21. T.M. Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW
ESSAYS, supra note 9, at 86.

22. Id. at 98-99.
23. See id. at 88-99.
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geared to illuminate the direct moral relation between two persons,
where that relation is brought about by the giving and receiving of
a certain kind of moral assurance as to future performance. The
duty to perform is owed to another and must be explained as such.
Third, Scanlon distinguishes between promises and legally binding
contracts and presents a moral basis for the enforceability of
contracts that is parallel to, but nonetheless distinct from, the moral
argument for the duty to keep one's promises.24 I wish to focus on
his discussion of the enforceability of contracts and see whether it
satisfactorily answers the Fuller and Perdue challenge.
Central to Scanlon's explanation of contracts as well as promises
is the idea of assurance. 5 The notion of assurance is simply that,
apart from a concern about the consequences of relying to one's
detriment upon another's word, one may want the other to do as
promised, in and of itself. One wants, in other words, to be assured
that the other person will do a certain thing which the latter is
otherwise morally free to do or not to do. It will not be enough for
the other to give timely warning of a change of mind before there
has been actual reliance. One wants actualperformance unless one
releases the other from his or her obligation to perform. Promising
is one way of providing this assurance. Not only promisees who
receive such assurances, but also promisors who give them, can
have an interest in being able to do so. In addition, given their
interests in providing and receiving assurances, both promisors and
promisees may wish to have reasonable legal remedies to motivate
performance. Promisors may want, therefore, to be able to undertake a legal obligation to perform. Accordingly, a principle that
makes performance legally obligatory and enforceable in certain
instances and under certain conditions can be something that would
be wanted by both promisors and promisees.
What might such a principle entail and how might it provide a
reasonable moral basis for the enforceability of contracts? Suppose
a situation in which each party knows that both have reasons for
wanting respectively to give or to obtain an assurance that one of
them will do something unless the other releases him or her from so

24. See id. at 99-111.
25. I am summarizing his discussion found at id. at 93-99.
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doing.2 6 One party-the promisor-acts with the aim of providing
this assurance by indicating to the other party-the promisee-his
or her intention to undertake a legal obligation to perform it. Not
only does the promisor intend that the promisee knows that he or
she is providing such assurance and undertaking a legal obligation
to fulfill it, but the promisee understands that this is the promisor's
intention and the promisor knows that the promisee knows this.
Scanlon seems to be of the view that nothing less than an actual
intention on the promisor's part to provide such assurance will
suffice.2 7 Finally, assume that the promisor has adequate opportunity to avoid legal liability (and therefore has sufficient understanding of his or her situation, has not been unacceptably constrained,
has adequate opportunity to know in advance the legal penalties
for breach of contract, and so forth) and that the remedies for
breach are not excessive. Scanlon argues that if, on these conditions,
a promisor makes a promise and fails to perform without being
released by the promisee and without special justification, it is
permissible to enforce legal "remedies such as specific performance
and the payment of [reasonably foreseeable] expectation damages"
for the breach.2"
Scanlon contends that a principle which embodies the foregoing
stipulations and conditions "cannot be reasonably rejected" by either
party.2 9 The justification for this conclusion is in two steps. First, a
principle of this kind reflects the fact that two parties have reason
to want to provide or obtain assurance, and enlist the use of legal
remedies to give support to the value of this assurance. Thus there
is, prima facie, good reason to permit the state to provide such
enforcement.3 0 The second step asks whether this use of state power
is something to which those against whom it may be used can
reasonably object. 3 ' Without going into the details of Scanlon's
discussion of this aspect, we may say that, according to him, the
principle ensures that individuals have adequate understanding
26. This and the following paragraphs summarize Scanlon's presentation of his argument
for the reasonableness of contractual enforcement found in id. at 103-11.
27. Id. at 104 ('The principle I propose ... requir[es] that A must indicate that he
understandshimself to be undertaking a legal obligation to do X." (emphasis added)).
28. Id. at 105-06.
29. Id. at 108.
30. Id.
31. Id.

1686

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1673

and opportunity to avoid making assurances, or incurring legal
consequences for so doing, if they do not wish to be subject to state
power for breach of their promises. Moreover, the costs of enforcement, including the proportionality of remedies to the aim of
providing assurance, are not such as to give promisors a reason
for rejecting this principle. Because individuals have reasonable
opportunity to avoid being bound, they cannot reasonably complain
about legal enforcement when they manifest the requisite intention
to perform. The fact that they may have reasons to regret their
promise when performance is due cannot be a basis for rejecting the
principle: the very point of the assurance is to rule out this kind of
reconsideration, and promisors have intentionally provided this
assurance when they can reasonably avoid doing so. To allow them
to escape legal enforcement on the basis of regret nullifies the whole
point of the assurance which they want to, and do, provide."
How does this explanation of contractual obligation answer the
Fuller and Perdue objection? Scanlon argues explicitly that a
principle of the foregoing kind would justify expectation damages or
specific performance for breach of a purely executory contract; that
is, before either party has performed and apart from detrimental
reliance upon the promise."3 The principle thus "recognizes an
independent basis of purely contractual obligation."3 4 One rationale
for legal enforcement is that "the threat of legal enforcement of
specific performance or expectation damages provides people with
an incentive to fulfill the contracts they make."3 5 But as Scanlon
himself notes, this rationale views contract remedies as having a
"quasi-criminal aspect"3 6 and so does not explain them as compensatory in character. How then, contra Fuller and Perdue, does
Scanlon's account of contractual obligation show that the expectation remedy can be understood as compensatory? Scanlon suggests
that, in addition to deterring promisors from breaching contracts,
the expectation remedies "give promisees what they have wanted

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 111.
Id.
Id. at 110.
Id.
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to be assured
of (or come as close to doing this as is practically
3' 7
possible.)
This answer cannot, however, possibly meet the Fuller and
Perdue objection. The fact that both promisors and promisees may
want to be assured of something does not, in itself, establish that
either owes the other this thing or, correlatively, that either is
entitled to it as against the other. Fuller's point is that a commitment to give anything, including the assurance of performance, need
not entail the creation of a legal or, let us say, a juridical, relation
of corresponding right and duty between the parties.3" The possibility of such a relation, which makes the thing assured something
that belongs in a juridical sense to the promisee just in virtue of the
promise and prior to the moment of performance, remains unexplained in this account. Failing to perform what has been assured
can quite reasonably and intelligibly be viewed as failing to confer
a benefit which the promisee expects and upon which he or she may
rely. This does not, however, show that what is promised is acquired
by and belongs to the promisee just on the basis of the other party's
promise, thus allowing breach to be viewed as an interference with
a present asset from which the promisee can by rights exclude the
promisor.
The difficulty with Scanlon's suggested rationale can be put this
way. It is the first step which provides the crucial positive basis
for contractual obligation. By contrast, the role of the second step is
essentially negative, ensuring that the imposition of the obligation
does not take parties unfairly by surprise, that it can reasonably
be avoided by those who do not wish to be put under such an
obligation, that the remedies for breach are not excessive, and so
forth. The second step does not specify, nor does it in any way
constitute, the contractual obligation obtaining between the parties.
It is the first step, and it alone, that is fitted to do this. Yet, in
Scanlon's account, the first step is rooted in the usefulness of
promises to parties and so embodies the idea of the rational as
39 The fact
distinct from that of the reasonable.
that promising
37. Id.
38. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
39. The distinction between the rational (conception of one's good) and the reasonable (fair
terms) is taken from Rawls. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 6-7
(Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
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involves an intentionalgiving of assurance in circumstances where
the promisor knows that the promisee wants the assurance does not
make it juridically unreasonablefor the promisor to fail to perform,
at least in the absence of invited detrimental reliance by the
promisee upon the promise. Strictly speaking, there is nothing in
Scanlon's first step that entitles the use of the idea of "owing" as
between the parties. In Scanlon's argument, it is the second step,
not the first, that embodies requirements of the reasonable. But the
second step, I have said, contributes nothing positive toward the
existence and the specificity of the contractual obligation.
C. Gordley
The third and final analysis of the moral basis of contractual
obligation that I wish to consider is that of James Gordley.4 ° He too
seeks explicitly to answer Fuller and Perdue. He sees clearly that
the correctness of their objection stands or falls with the propriety
of their premise that a promisee does not acquire a right to performance at the time the promise is made, so that the breach cannot be
understood as depriving him or her of something to which he or she
is already entitled.4 1 At the same time, as Gordley emphasizes in his
criticism of prior efforts to answer the Fuller and Perdue objection,
it is not enough simply to assume or to assert the existence of such
a right.4 2 We must be able to explain it and provide reasons for
concluding that the promisee has it. Rather than try to show why
any promisee should invariably acquire a right to performance,
Gordley suggests that "[i]t would be better to ask why he would
sometimes want such a right and why the promisor might wish him
to have it."43 Supposing the parties have a reason that the law
should respect, then, in those instances, it should recognize such a
right. He then notes a number of reasons why parties might want
to transfer a right to performance by gift or exchange.44

40. This Section draws on James Gordley, ContractLaw in the Aristotelian Tradition,in
THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS, supranote 9, at 265.
41. Id. at 327-28.
42. Id. at 329.
43. Id. at 330.
44. Id. at 330-32.
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In the case of gifts, promisors might wish to confer a right to
performance because they rightly believe that their present decision
to make the gift is more likely to be correct than a future decision
not to make it; or promisors may rightly believe that conferring such
a right on promisees is more consistent with the kind of relationship
the promisors want with the promisees; or finally, promisors may
know that promisees do not trust them to perform in the absence of
a legal obligation and may wish to reassure the promisees." In the
case of exchanges, promisees may want the right to performance in
order to lock in a favorable bargain. To achieve this, promisees may
promise promisors some benefit in return."
Notice that all these reasons, however different they may be in
content, refer to what one or both parties may want or believe at a
given point in time. Promisors may want to give a gift for various
reasons and may believe that this present desire is "better" or "more
correct" than a future contrary preference or decision. Promisees
may want to be sure that they can count on performance by
promisors. The sort of reason that Gordley suggests has to do with
the interests that parties may have in giving or receiving a right to
perform. Indeed, the reasons amount to interests that the parties
may have simply in making gifts or exchanges.
What, however, can be said to the party who changes his or her
mind because he or she no longer has that interest at the time
performance is required? If it is simply a question of a party's
interests in making a gift or exchange, why should the party be
constrained by interests that he or she no longer has? We must
analyze this question on the premise that the promisee has not
relied detrimentally and that the issue is one of enforcing purely
executory contracts of gift or exchange. If the reason for the
transaction lies in the promisor's interest in making it, that reason
has force only so long as that interest continues. Breach reflects
a change in the promisor's interests, nothing more. The idea of
constraint is without support. Where it is the promisee's interest
that counts, then, at most, the argument so far shows simply that
non-performance will frustrate the fulfillment of that interest. Once
again, it shows that breach constitutes merely a failure to benefit
45. Id. at 330.

46. Id. at 331.
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the promisee, not the deprivation of anything that already belongs
to the promisee as a matter of rights. In conclusion, unless there is
something more than an analysis of the parties' reasons for wanting
to give or receive performance, a right to performance remains
unexplained and the Fuller and Perdue challenge stands unanswered.
Gordley must supplement this account of reasons with something
more. And this something more is a teleological ethical analysis
in terms of virtues which draws on the Aristotelian tradition.4 7
Briefly, the parties' interests in giving and exchanging are referred
to the virtues of liberality and commutative justice. The law
should advance these virtues, all things being equal. At least,
interests and acts that fulfill these virtues are worthy of legal
recognition. This second step parallels the second step in Scanlon's
argument.48 In contrast to the essentially negative and limiting
function of Scanlon's second step, however, Gordley's appears
positively to provide the needed basis for the promisee's acquisition
of a protected interest in the performance at contract formation.
Following Aristotle's definition of liberality which entails giving
49
"to the right people the right amounts and at the right time,"
Gordley argues that the selective enforcement of certain donative
promises is justified on the ground that keeping such promises
accords with, and embodies, the virtue of liberality. This requires
evaluating and weighing the motives, purposes, and relevant
circumstances of the donor, the needs and moral worthiness of
the donee, presumably the value and the ethical significance of
alternative uses of the benefit including the legitimate interests and
needs of third parties, and so forth. The aim of this exercise is to
determine whether and to what extent a given promise qualifies at
a given point in time as an act of liberality.
But even where a promise does qualify as an act of liberality, it
cannot therefore rule out a later change in the promisor's intention.
No one is presumably under an obligation to exercise liberality
toward a particular person on a particular occasion. Rather, giving
to a particular person on a particular occasion is merely a way of
47. I draw here on the discussion in Gordley, supra note 40, at 297-313.
48. See supra text preceding note 32.
49. Gordley, supra note 40, at 297 (quoting ARISTOTLE, NiCOMACHEAN ETHICS, in THE
BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935 (Richard McKeon ed., W.D. Ross trans., 1941)).
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instantiating liberality. It need not occur in just this way. So acting
in accordance with the virtue of liberality does not entail that one
must keep any particular donative promise. Moreover, the very
character of this virtue is inherently unsuited to specify the kind of
transactional obligation for which we are looking. For, firstly, the
virtue specifies a state of inward moral character that is expressed
in external acts, and so, unlike for example the virtue of justice, in
no way essentially involves relation to another. And even if there is
some obligation in relation to others, it is not one owed to anyone in
particular. There is nothing in the idea of liberality that suggests
the sort of relation that might constitute a transfer of rights
between two, and only two, parties. Yet, as Gordley emphasizes, an
answer to Fuller and Perdue must be on the basis of such a relation.
What about the virtue of commutative justice? This virtue does
have the form of relation to another, indeed the very sort of
transactional structure that is requisite to contractual obligation.5 °
Gordley argues that a grossly unequal exchange of values is ruled
out by commutative justice unless the difference is intended as
a gift. Thus, where the parties have an interest in making an
exchange on equal terms, enforcing the agreement is in accordance
with commutative justice.5 However, this shows only that the
enforcement of certain promises is or is not compatible with the
requirements of commutative fairness, not why a promise to
exchange on fair terms is unalterable and binding in the first place.
Though a promise to exchange equal value may be consistent with
commutative justice, it does not follow that the failure altogether to
perform this promise violates it. Why an intention or promise to
exchange for equal value should be binding despite a later change
of mind on the part of the promisor cannot be explained simply by
the fairness of the terms so intended or promised. Performance of
such a promise may be permissible because it is consistent with
equality in exchange, without being obligatory. But unless it can be
so conceived, the promisee does not have the requisite protected
interest to justify the expectation remedy as compensation. A theory
justifying enforcement of promises must show how a promise, as
part of a voluntary interaction between two parties, is so constituted
50. See id. at 307-08.
51. See id. at 308-10.
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that it can accomplish a transfer of rights from one to the other,
thereby establishing a relation of right and duty with respect to a
promised performance. Presumably, the explanation of a requirement of equality in exchange would be part of this analysis.
In Gordley's discussion, the intelligibility of promise as a mode of
transferring. rights remains unexplained from the standpoints of
both commutative justice and liberality. Although promises may
instantiate, be consistent with, or instrumentally further liberality
and commutative justice, these virtues are specified and justified
independently of any analysis showing how promises can be
understood as rights-acquiring or rights-alienating acts and therefore how the parties' voluntary interaction can constitute a transfer
of rights between them. Gordley's analysis of gift and exchange
merely confirms Fuller and Perdue's basic claim that the expectation remedy cannot be explained as compensatory but instead must
be justified on policy grounds of some sort.
Despite their evident differences, the three justifications of
contractual obligation discussed above share a common feature, and
it is this feature that prevents them from providing an answer to
Fuller and Perdue. Whatever else it entails, contractual obligation
is a direct normative relation between two parties, and this relation
must embody reasonable or fair terms of interaction such that,
through their mutual assents, one party acquires something that
comes under his or her rights exclusive as against the other party.
In this way, the contractual relation can be understood as juridical
and nonperformance of a promise can be conceived as injury,
making expectation damages or specific performance compensatory in character. Each of the theories considered bases the direct
relation between the parties on substantive interests that reflect
their rational good and particular purposes: the idea of the rational.
The parties have reasons to want to give and receive commitments
and they communicate their decisions to do so, knowing that this is
what the other party wants and this is how the other party understands his or her words. But the fact that something is wanted and
answers to one's rational advantage does not, as such, bring into
play the morally distinct idea of the reasonable.Something more is
needed to specify fair terms of interaction. The idea of the rational
does not, and cannot, explain why, even if one regrets one decision
on the basis of a different understanding of one's interests and
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purposes, one is nevertheless constrained to honor it as something
owed to the other party. More particularly, the idea of the rational
does not show how merely failing to serve another's interests
can signify injuring something that already belongs rightfully to
the other. It is not surprising, therefore, that the three theories
supplement this analysis with something else that goes beyond the
idea of the rational only. I have tried to show in some detail,
however, that in each case the additional element is inherently
unsuited to establish the specific kind of normative relation between
the parties that must be presupposed if the expectation remedy is
to be understood as compensatory. We need to make a fresh start to
see whether it is possible, after all, to frame a conception of
contractual obligation that illuminates, and does not obscure, this
most basic datum of contract law.

III. CONTRACT AS A TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP
My primary aim in this third Part is to set out clearly and in some
detail an analysis of contract formation that explains how the
parties' mutual assents can transfer an ownership right from one to
the other prior to and independently of performance, and on this
basis show that breach of contract is an interference with a
protected interest, making the expectation remedy compensatory in
character. I argue that this analysis, which I call "contract as a
transfer of ownership," is internal to, in the sense of being at least
implicit in, the way contract formation is understood from a legal
point of view. To this end, I discuss in detail how the conception of
contract as a transfer of ownership is reflected in the doctrines of
contract formation. I also explain how this analysis of contract is
continuous with the well-accepted principles of property acquisition
while being qualitatively distinct from it. A key contrast that I
develop in the following argument is that between property and
ownership. On the view that I shall elaborate, "ownership" is a
larger, general conception of which "property" (right in rem) is a
particular instance. Contract rights, I shall argue, are another,
different particular instance of ownership rights.5 2 Consistent with
52. This view is clearly Kant's, among others. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS (1797), reprinted in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 353, 424 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans.,

1694

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1673

this view, I refer to contract as a transfer of ownership, not as a
transfer of property.
A. The Analogy of a Physical Transferof Ownership
I begin the task of specifying a conception of contractual obligation that justifies the compensatory character of the expectation
remedies by considering a simpler legal transaction that introduces
crucial constituent features of the contractual relation.5 3 Let us
suppose, then, a physical transfer of ownership whereby I physically
give you something that you in turn physically take from me. We do
this in the absence of any prior agreement. I may give the thing to
you either for nothing or for something else in return. Before the
transfer, I own it; after the transfer, you do. Such a transfer of
ownership from one person to another is constituted by certain
definite mutually related acts. What are these acts?
First, in order to transfer ownership, there must be a decision on
the part of the owner to part with his or her property. This decision
is embodied in the physical giving of the thing over to the other
party. A merely physical transfer that does not express this
intent cannot produce a change in ownership. Unless the first party
expresses his or her will to give up the thing, it is not available for
appropriation by the second party or by anyone else. Accordingly,
the act of giving it over counts, we shall say, as the external
expression of the will to alienate the thing.
But the will to alienate is not, by itself, sufficient to constitute a
transfer of ownership. The immediate and necessary consequence
of alienation is that the one who alienates ceases to be owner. By
itself, this does not make anyone else the thing's owner. To confer
ownership upon the second party and thus to constitute a transfer
of ownership, a second act is also necessary. The second party must
express the will to appropriate the thing as his or her own. This
decision to appropriate, embodied in the taking of the thing, must
come after and in responseto the decision to alienate. Otherwise the
act of the second party cannot be compatible with the first party's
1996).
53. Grotius notes the parallel between what I call a "physical transfer" and contract. See
2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELu Ac PAcis LIBRI TRES bk II, ch. VI, at 260-61, ch. XI, at 330-31
(Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press 1925).
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right of ownership and so no right can be acquired. Thus a transfer
of ownership is constituted by two acts that are temporally successive.
The relation between the acts of alienation and appropriation
must be further specified in the following way. The idea of a transfer
of ownership from one to another implies: first, that the second
party's acquisition of ownership comes, not only with the consent
of, but also from, the first party; and second, that the right of
ownership that is in the first party is the very same that is acquired
by the second.
The significance of the first point may be brought out as follows.
If the first party merely abandons his or her thing such that it
ceases to be owned by him or her, it may, consistently with rights,
be appropriated by anyone else. If someone does take it, he or she
does so as a finder who will have a right to the thing as against
anyone else who does not already have an existing proprietary right
in it. The important point is that any such right would not be
derived from the decision of the first party. The fact that the first
party was once an owner of the thing does not figure in the analysis
of the acts that are positively constitutive of the finder's right. It has
merely the negative significance that the thing is not owned and so,
to that extent, is available for appropriation by others. The thing
is appropriated in the condition of being unowned. The idea of a
transfer plays no role whatsoever.
For there to be a transfer, then, the second party's ownership
must derive from that of the first party in the sense that the second
party must appropriate the thing in the condition of being presently
owned by the first. Now, in general terms, a person's exercise of the
power to alienate his or her thing is an exercise of ownership
rights.5 4 If, therefore, the second party is to appropriate the thing
qua presently owned by the first, the former must exercise the
power to appropriate in relation to the latter's exercise of the power
to alienate. It must be possible to conceive the acts of alienation and
appropriation as two mutually related and absolutely co-present
exercises of ownership with respect to the object of ownership.
Insofar as these acts transfer ownership from one person to
another, neither side can be considered without the other. The
54. I discuss this uncontroversial proposition in detail at pages 1700-01 of this Essay.
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fundamental unit of analysis is therefore this relation as such. In
sum, a transfer is constituted by mutually related acts that must
be understood under the two aspects of being successive in time
and also co-present.
In the case of a physical transfer of property, the party who
appropriates the thing gains ownership of it simultaneously with
physical possession of it. Like the party who transferred the
property, he or she has the very same right to exclude others from
using it without his or her consent. There is no difference in the
right alienated or appropriated. The fact that the parties may have
different purposes for transacting or that the transfer may affect
their well-being in different ways does not change this identity.
This is because all such potentially differentiating factors are, in
themselves, irrelevant to the analysis of the transfer of ownership.
To elaborate, whether parties have transferred ownership is not
determined by reference to the particular purposes or needs that
may motivate their decisions to transact, and the validity of the
transfer does not depend upon whether the parties are better off or
sufficiently satisfied as a result of the transfer. The only thing that
counts is whether the parties can reasonably be viewed as having
done the requisite acts of alienation and appropriation. When I hand
over my thing to you and you take it, it is yours even if I come to
regret my decision to do this.5 And it is yours just and only because
of our jointly related acts. What counts is simply whether one party
has given up physical control over the thing by placing it under
the other party's control. The undeniable fact that parties have
particular substantive ends and needs that lead them to transact is
irrelevant to the legal analysis of whether they have transacted. The
only requirement is that the physical movements of giving and
taking the thing express an intent to alienate and appropriate it,
thereby investing these physical movements with the meaning of
giving up control in favor of another who asserts control. The
physical movements must be purposive conduct in this sense. In
given circumstances, it may certainly be the case that the fact that
a party has this or that purpose may be indirectly relevant in

55. I assume here, of course, the absence of vitiating factors such as fraud, duress,
misrepresentation, and so forth that would be defenses to the second party's claim via the
transfer.
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establishing the existence of purposiveness. Still, whether a party's
particular purpose is fulfilled by the transaction does not bear on
this requirement and therefore is irrelevant to the analysis of the
validity of the transfer.
Having physical possession of the thing transferred, the appropriating party can rightfully exclude any and every third party who
does not already have possession of it. Vis-A-vis such others, first
possession is the basis of entitlement. But what about as against
the party who transfers ownership? The essential condition of the
second party's right to exclude the first is the latter's voluntary
alienation of his or her thing. Because the first party has present
physical possession before the second party, it is the former's
consent to transfer ownership that makes the latter's taking
possession consistent with rights. This being so, the relation of
rights between the parties to the transfer is founded upon a
different basis than the relation between the second party and all
those not privy to the transaction. The relation of rights between the
transacting parties is wholly specific to them and is established
between them as two definite persons through their interaction.
B. From FirstAcquisition to Contract
Taking this discussion of a physical transfer of ownership as a
starting point, I want now to consider what the analysis of a
transfer presupposes, namely, that it must be possible to acquire
unowned things, and what this analysis yields, namely, the
possibility of a contractualtransfer of ownership. I shall do this by
drawing upon widely accepted principles and fundamental normative ideas in private law.
A physical transfer of ownership involves appropriation by one
person from another of something that is already owned. Hence, if
an infinite regress is to be avoided, a transfer presupposes that it
must be possible for individuals to acquire something by themselves
and not only through others. This form of acquisition would have to
be of something that is not presently owned, since otherwise it
would have to be transferred. To acquire an unowned thing, it is not
sufficient to need or wish for it: one must do something.56 Prior to
56. I discuss in more detail the requirements for the acquisition of unowned things in
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this act, and therefore in the absence of a right of ownership with
respect to the thing, the object is available to anyone and everyone.
Each has a liberty or privilege,5 7 as opposed to a right, to do as he or
she wishes with it. But this liberty means no more than that no one
can wrong another by making use of the thing, and that therefore
no one's consent is necessary before others may permissibly affect
it.5 8 Because, prior to any act, there is only a common liberty, and no
right, to affect things, anyone can make use of things on the basis
of his or her unilateral decision and without the prior consent of
others. With the performance of the requisite act, all this changes.
Now the one who does the act is entitled to exclude others from
using it without his or her consent. They are no longer at liberty to
do with it as they will and therefore they no longer have the power
to make the thing their own through their unilateral acts. Inasmuch
as this change affects only their liberty and not their rights,
however, they have no rightful grounds to oppose it.
What sort of act is necessary and sufficient to establish this right
of ownership with respect to unowned things? It must be an act that
brings the thing under the agent's present and effective power to
affect it as he or she wishes-that is, under his or her control.
More precisely, it must be an act that has this character so far as
reasonably appears to others. Whether there is such an act is
determined wholly from this external, meaning other-related, point
of view. Now, where the object to be acquired is unowned, it must be
something that is distinct and physically separate from the person,
otherwise, if it were attached to or a part of the person, it would
already belong to him or her by the right of bodily integrity.
Therefore an unowned object must be a corporeal thing that exists
in space independently and apart from persons.5 9 How, then, can

Peter Benson, The Philosophy of Property Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 752, 759-77 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
57. In Hohfeld's sense of the term. See WESLEYNEWCOMBHOHFELD, FUNDAMENTALLEGAL
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 39,42-50 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923).
58. Pufendorf emphasizes this in his discussion "On the Origin of Dominion," which is
Chapter IV of Book IV of ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS, supra note 1, at 532, 550, 55354. He explains this juridical condition as one of things being in common or in community in
a negative sense in which, prior to any act, no one has a right to anything that is exclusive visA-vis others and things belong no more to one person than another. Id.
59. This is Kant's argument. KANT, supra note 52, at 401-02.

2007]

CONTRACT AS A TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP

1699

individuals manifest to others the fact that they have present and
effective power to affect such a thing as they wish?6"
In answering this question, it is crucial to keep in mind that the
sort of object at issue here, being unowned, must be a corporeal
object that is physically separate from individuals and also must be
acquirable by individuals acting unilaterally, that is, without the
actual consent or participation of others. The idea of social cooperation plays no role here whatsoever. Consequently, the requisite act
which makes this object one's own must be one that, independently
of any prior agreement with others, can reasonably appear as such
to all those who are at liberty to affect it. And because any and
every one is identically at liberty to affect it, the act of unilateral
appropriation by one must convey the requisite meaning to unspecified, indeterminate others. Given these premises, it is difficult to
conceive how, as an empirical matter, individuals can manifest to
others that they have brought these objects under their exclusive
control except by initially physically affecting them in ways that
reasonably evidence such control. One who exercises this control
over a corporeal object has physical possession of it. Private law
doctrine refers to this act of control as "occupancy." We see, then,
that, from a legal point of view, the whole role and significance of
physical occupancy must lie in its being a sign to all others that one
has brought a corporeal object under one's purposes by one's
unilateral decision. So long as others, who do not have present
control over an object, may reasonably infer a person's purposive
subordination of the object to his or her wishes, a right of ownership
arises against them. In this way, the person who establishes this
control by taking the thing into his or her physical possession before
others is deemed owner relative to those others. First occupancy is
the basis of original acquisition, that is, acquisition of unowned
things.
Although individuals must initially take physical possession of
something to make it their own, it by no means follows that their
right of ownership depends upon their continuing to do so.6"
60. For more detailed discussion, see Benson, supranote 56, at 761-64.
61. As Oliver Wendell Holmes stated:
Every one agrees that it is not necessary to have always a present power over
the thing, otherwise one could only possess what was under his hand....
... When certain facts have once been made manifest which confer a right,
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Physically holding the thing is significant only because, and insofar
as, it demonstrates the requisite control over it. As a matter of fact
and depending upon the kind of thing, circumstances, and so forth,
such control can be reasonably evident to others without the
necessity of continuous physical holding. So long as this control is
reasonably manifest to others, that is enough to sustain the
existence of the ownership right. Further, though the individual
who so acts does so for particular reasons and in the pursuit of
particular interests, these reasons and interests in their particularity play no direct role whatsoever in determining whether the
requirements of first occupancy have been met. The intent to
subordinate something to one's control can be evident so long as
one's conduct can be viewed as purposive, whatever the particular
purpose or interest pursued.
There are essentially three modes in which one can exercise the
right of ownership." Each of these reflects three distinct ways in
which one can make reasonably apparent to others one's control
over one's thing. The initial act of taking physical possession of
something presently unowned establishes control over the object
and, with this, the right of ownership in the thing vis-a-vis others.
This is appropriation and, conceptually, it is the first way in which
ownership exists and is exercised. Having control over the thing
creates the possibility of using it for one's purposes and needs,
whatever these may be. The failure to put the thing to any uses at
all brings into question the continuance of the intent to control the
thing, and consequently the very basis of the ownership right.
Actual use of what one controls is thus the fulfillment of taking
possession and represents the second way in which ownership is
exercised. In addition to taking possession and use, there is a third
way of exercising the right of ownership: one may decide to abandon
it altogether or yield it into the control of another. This third way,
which is alienation, asserts control over the thing but in a manner
there is no general ground on which the law need hold the right at an end except
the manifestation of some fact inconsistent with its continuance ....
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 186 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ.
Press 1963) (1881).
62. The discussion in this paragraph follows Hegel's account of the three "modifications
of property" in G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT para. 53 (T.M. Knox trans., 1952). I
present this approach in more detail and contrast it with the '%undle-of-rights" view in
Benson, supra note 56, at 768-77.
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that makes evident to others that one will not use it. It entails doing
something, or failing to do something, to or with one's thing that
places it beyond one's control. It is an act that both presupposes
and nullifies such control. The result of this exercise of control is
that the thing is placed in a condition of being available to others in
general or to some definite person, not the now-former owner. With
this, the analysis returns to the first step-the liberty to appropriate
and the necessity of taking possession-and so is completed.
The preceding discussion makes clear that in order to constitute
oneself as an owner of something, one must perform acts which
themselves are acts of ownership. To be an owner one must actually
exercise the power of ownership: one must take possession, use, or
alienate the thing. Enforceability is nothing other than the normative meaning of these acts. Thus, whether legally enforceable consequences flow depends wholly upon the existence of the requisite
acts. And although these acts must be purposive, their status as acts
with normative meaning is entirely independent of the particular
purposes or interests that may motivate the agent. Their status as
acts is not tied in any way to an agent having a certain purpose or
interest. Moreover, the fact that an individual needs or wishes for
something does not qualify as an act, and certainly not the sort of
external act that meets the requirement of occupancy.
The immediate and necessary juridical consequence of appropriation is that the object is no longer available to others to possess, use,
or alienate. Others' acts can no longer qualify as acts of rightful
appropriation, use, or alienation." Reflexively, the owner alone can
permissibly perform these acts. Note that any and everyone who
does not already have ownership of the thing is under this identical
disability. The acquired right is, in this sense, a "right against the
world": a right in rem. This prohibition applies, however, to each
person as a distinct and separate individual capable of acting for his
or her own purposes. More precisely, it applies as between the
owner and each other person who can actually affect the owner's
object. The fact that the right is in relation to persons who count
as (indefinitely) anyone, and is therefore a right in rem, is entailed
by the idea of acquisition of unowned things and more particularly
63. 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 1, at 536 ("[Plroprietorship connotes the exclusion of
another's right to the same thing ....").
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the fundamental point that one can acquire these only by one's
unilateral act. This is the only character ownership can have when
it is with respect to such objects.
It is important to underline that on this analysis, the right of
ownership does not in the least ensure that owners can actually use
their things or that they will be better off or satisifed if they do use
them. Whether an owner's interests, needs, or purposes are met is
of no direct consequence, juridically. The only thing that the right
ensures is that no one else Can rightfully appropriate, use, or
alienate the owner's object without his or her consent. Of course, if
the owner no longer wants the object because it fails to satisfy his
or her interests, and, as a result, the owner gives it up through
nonuse or by an express decision to alienate it, the object becomes
once more available to others. But this consequence flows from the
owner's acts, not from the non-satisfaction of his or her interests.
A physical transfer of ownership presupposes that it is possible
to acquire unowned things ("first acquisition") and I have explained
how this is accomplished by one's individual action without the
participation or consent of others.6 4 There is continuity between the
analysis of first acquisition and a physical transfer of ownership.
The constituent acts of ownership in first acquisition-appropriation
and alienation-are the very same that figure in a physical transfer
of ownership. In both, enforceability is the normative meaning of the
requisite acts. In neither do the needs or particular interests and
purposes of agents belong to the constitutive grounds of rights.
Whether an unowned thing has been acquired as property or a thing
owned by one person has been transferred to another is decided
wholly by whether the required acts have taken place, irrespective
of the bearing of this conclusion upon anyone's needs or purposes.
The determination in both forms of acquisition is framed in terms
that abstract from the question of advantage or disadvantage.
The idea of a transfer of ownership, we saw, requires that the
right acquired is identical to the right that is alienated. The
analysis of first acquisition is fully consistent with this. The right of
ownership, comprising the three aspects of taking possession, use,
and alienation, is not defined in terms of the particular (and
different) purposes to which individuals may put their things or in
64. See supra pp. 1698-99.
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terms of the particular (and different) interests which they seek to
satisfy in so using them. These factors are irrelevant. Rather, the
right of ownership is defined simply as an abstract right to exclude
others from treating it as their own. No reference is made to any
factors that might differentiate the persons excluded from the
owner. Because the right of ownership is defined in abstraction from
all differentiating factors, it is the same right throughout and it is
identical in every instance of its exercise. Without this, it would not
be possible to conceive of one and the same right being transferred
from an initial owner to a second party.
At the same time, the analysis of a transfer of ownership goes
one step further than that of first acquisition insofar as the
former makes interaction between two definite persons the constitutive basis of the acquisition. In first acquisition, ownership is
established through an individual's unilateral act. Yet the essential
normative meaning of ownership is that it entails relation to
another: others are no longer at liberty to possess, use, or alienate
the object that comes under another's right. In keeping with this
other-related normative meaning, the standpoint from which an
individual's acts are judged is how these acts are reasonably viewed
by others. A transfer makes relation to another the essential and
explicit basis of acquisition, thereby bringing out what remains
merely latent in first acquisition.
The modality of a physical transfer of ownership not only makes
explicit the other-related character of the ownership right that is
established by first acquisition. In addition, it implicitly contains
the constitutive acts of contractualacquisition, as I will now explain.
The central difference between a physical transfer and contract
is that contract distinguishes and separates in time the two aspects
which coincide in the physical transfer: rightful acquisition and
physical delivery. In a physical transfer, the transfer of ownership
coincides with physical delivery. The latter is the vehicle of the
former. By contrast, the parties' entitlements in a contract are
fully and completely established by their agreement, prior to and
independently of performance through which physical delivery is
effected. On this view, the constitutive acts of alienation and
appropriation in a contract transfer ownership before the change in
physical occupancy, in this way providing the needed basis for
construing the expectation remedy as compensatory. If we can show
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that this difference between contract and a physical transfer simply
brings out what is already implicit in the latter without introducing
any additional or extraneous considerations, this would be the first
step toward specifying a conception of contract that is juridically
plausible and reasonable. This is what I shall now try to do.
The possibility of differentiating between agreement and performance, and therefore between the aspect of rightful acquisition
and obtaining physical possession, rests upon two premises. First,
it must be possible for someone to have something as his or her own
exclusive of others without first having actual physical possession
of it. Second, it must be possible for parties mutually to alienate and
appropriate ownership simply through their mutually related
expressions of assent prior to and independent of delivery.
These premises are already contained in the preceding explanations of first acquisition and physical transfer.
As to the first premise, I have already discussed how first
acquisition, although it rests upon an initial act of physical taking
into possession, does not require continuous physical possession. So
long as owners can reasonably signal to others their continuing
present control such that they can do as they please with their
things, that is sufficient. Continuous physical possession may not be
necessary to demonstrate this in given circumstances. This point
rests upon a deeper basis."6 The object of first acquisition is an
external thing that is separable from persons. Indeed, it is only
insofar as it is actually separate and distinct from me that it can
count as such an object. If it is part of and not separate from me, it
is something that already belongs to me without my needing to
acquire it. Accordingly, if my right to something, say my pen,
depends upon the object being in my physical possession so that it
immediately ceases to be mine when I put it down, another can only
affect my right to it by impinging on me (my body). This, however,
would engage only my right to bodily integrity, not a right to some
external object that must first be acquired. The fact that my right
is supposed to be with respect to an external thing would play no
role as such and would not be made evident. Therefore, it is implicit

65. I am following Kant here. His discussion is in the Doctrine of Right, part of THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 52, at 401-04.
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in the notion of acquisition of an external thing that it cannot
require physical possession of it of any kind.
This brings me to the second premise, namely, that the preceding
analysis of a physical transfer already contains the idea that it is
possible for parties mutually to alienate and appropriate ownership
simply through their mutually related expressions of assent prior to
and independent of delivery.
In a physical transfer, ownership is vested in the second party
simultaneously with delivery. Indeed, it appears that it is in and
through delivery-and therefore the actual physical giving and
taking-that rightful acquisition is accomplished. We have seen,
however, that it is not physical delivery as such that transfers
ownership. Unless delivery expresses the requisite assents of the
parties, there is no change of ownership. To produce juridical effects,
the physical giving and taking must express and embody, respectively, the will to alienate and the will to appropriate. From a legal
point of view, delivery is normatively significant solely inasmuch as
it embodies the parties' mutual assent. The decisions to alienate and
to appropriate take the form of giving and taking physical possession. Mutual assent is the regulative normative idea. It is signaled
through the physical acts of transfer. In the analysis of both the
physical transfer and first acquisition, the requisite physical acts
are justified on the ground that, in given circumstances, they are
needed to signal reasonablyto othersthe taking or giving of control.
The fact of their being physical has no intrinsic significance.
We have seen that the key feature that distinguishes a physical
transfer from first acquisition is that, in the former alone, the right
vests through the interaction between two parties. Implicit in the
analysis of a physical transfer is the notion, then, that if the parties
are able through their interaction to manifest to each other their
mutual assents, this must be sufficient. Whereas in the case of a
physical transfer the parties' mutual assents are expressed in the
form of physical giving and taking, this is not the only way it can be
done. In contract, the decisions to alienate and appropriate are
embodied in an agreement, not in the giving and taking of physical
possession. There is nothing inherently problematic in the parties
expressing these decisions through the medium of language which
is, after all, the most precise means by which parties can convey
mutual assent to each other. In this case, in contrast to a physical
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transfer, the acts manifesting mutual assent are explicitly expressions of assent: they are reasonably intended and understood as
such. Of course, we have yet to specify what sorts of expressions are
suited to signal this. I shall take this further question up in the next
Part where I argue that expressions of assent that satisfy the
requirements of offer and acceptance and of consideration are
sufficient to do this.
Supposing for the moment that it is indeed possible to specify the
mutual expressions of assent that constitute the requisite contractual acts of alienation and appropriation, the question is: what is
the juridical effect of these expressions of assent?
In the analysis of a physical transfer, we saw that the basis of the
second party's right to retain the object transferred in the face of
change of mind by the first party is the fact of their mutual assent
to transfer as expressed in the delivery.6 6 By delivery, the first
party gives up control over something in favor of the second who
takes control over it. The fact that the first party may want or need
it back for whatever reason is completely irrelevant. As I have
tried to emphasize throughout the discussions of first acquisition
and physical transfer, wants, needs, wishes, or expectations are not
grounds of ownership. Only an act asserting control over something,
so long as it is compatible with the rights of others, establishes
ownership. The question of entitlement is decided simply by determining the existence or not of the requisite physical transfer. The
relation of rights is just the normative meaning of this transfer. And
because the second party's claim as against the first is rooted in
their interaction (that is, the physical transfer), this entitlement
applies only as between them. In relation to others, however, the
second party's right rests on the fact that he or she has taken
physical possession of the object before them in accordance with the
principle of first acquisition.
This analysis applies to contract, only with the important
difference that we must now take into account the contractual
distinction between agreement and performance. Accordingly, the
right that the second party acquires against the first at the point of
agreement and prior to performance is one that is established
through their mutual assents and is specified only as between
66. See supraPart III.A.
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them. Once it is determined that the requisite assents exist, the
question of contractual rights and duties is answered. There is no
further issue as to why the promisor must perform as promised.6 7
The answer must be that it is no longer within his or her liberty to
act inconsistently with their agreement since the agreement has
already vested ownership in the promisee. The duty to perform is
simply the normative meaning of the transfer of ownership that has
already taken place at the moment of agreement. Assuming the
existence of such a transfer, the promisor has no grounds in right to
claim the object. Breach is thus an interference with the promisee's
ownership interest acquired at contract formation. It constitutes an
injury in the legal sense. The expectation remedies may now be
understood as correcting this injury and as ensuring that the
promisee's ownership interest is respected. They are compensatory
in character.
This protected interest belongs to the promisee as a result of the
parties' interaction (that is, their mutual assents embodied in their
agreement) and therefore holds only as between them. Prior to
performance, the promisee has no protected interest in relation to
third parties. When performance takes place and the promisee gains
physical possession of the object of ownership, the promisee does
have a protected interest against third parties in virtue of this
physical possession in accordance with the principle of first
acquisition. But as between the contracting parties, performance
does not add to or in any way change the relation of rights. In legal
contemplation, this relation must be completely and exhaustively
established at the moment of agreement. If this were not the case,
then the expectation remedy, which aims to give the promisee the
value of the promised performance, would give the promisee something new in relation to what was acquired at contract formation.
The remedy could not function as a principle of compensation.
Fuller and Perdue's objection would stand.

67. This is Kant's point in his disagreement with Mendelssohn. Kant, supra note 52, at
423. I discuss this in Peter Benson, External Freedom According to Kant, 87 COLuM. L. REV.
559, 563-67 (1987).
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C. The ConstituentActs of a ContractualTransfer: Offer and
Acceptance and the Doctrine of Consideration
The next task is to specify in detail the form and content of the
mutually related assents that can transfer ownership at the
moment of agreement. What are the constitutive acts of contractual
acquisition? I will draw upon the doctrines of offer and acceptance
and of consideration to elucidate these acts."8 Doing so makes it
more plausible to view the idea of a transfer of ownership as having
practical reality because it is implicit in actual legal principles and
doctrines.
The central organizing idea of the common law doctrine of offer
and acceptance is that a contract is formed by two externally
manifested expressions of assent to the very same terms. An offer
must include a promise by the offeror inasmuch as it necessarily
looks to the future and gives the person to whom it is addressed
an assurance that, on some contingency at least, he shall have
something.6 9 However, as opposed to the moral duty to keep one's
promise, the offer binds in law only if it is met by the return assent
of the offeror. A contract is made by both parties and is irreducibly
two-sided. No obligation is imposed on the offeror unless and until
there has been an acceptance. Thus the offeror makes the offeree a
potential co-author of the relation; a second act is requested to
complete the first. Indeed, an offer must say not only what the
offeror promises to do but also what the offeree must do in return.
The offer thus states a whole, two-sided transaction. In this way,
the offer reflects in itself the requirement that the source of the
obligation is in two manifestations of will, not one.
Consistent with this relational character of the offer, the question
of whether there has been an offer and, if so, for which terms, is
decided objectively-that is, by how the offeror's words and deeds
reasonably appear to the offeree in the context of their interaction. °
68. My discussion takes these familiar principles of contract formation as they are
invariably presented in the case law and standard text books. I consider the two doctrines at
greater length and more fully in Benson, The Unity of ContractLaw, supranote 9, at 138-53
(offer and acceptance) and 153-84 (consideration).
69. Samuel Wiliston, An Offer Is a Promise, 23 ILL. L. REV. 100, 101 (1928).
70. On the definition and the role of the objective test, see Samuel Williston, Mutual
Assent in the Formationof Contracts,14 ILL. L. REv. 85 (1919).
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It is this manifestation of assent as it reasonably appears to the
other party that is operative in bringing about contract formation.
The legally relevant factor is not its author's state of mind; nor is
the expression of assent pertinent for the reason that it may be
evidence of that state of mind. Rather, the reasonable appearance
of assent as such is the real and true assent from the legal point of
view. This is always so, even if a court could be persuaded in
particular circumstances that the offeror's actual state of mind was
otherwise. It is important to note here that, in accordance with this
objective approach, the particular purpose or motive the offeror may
have for proposing given terms is, in and of itself, irrelevant. The
only thing that matters so far as contract formation is concerned is
whether or not the offeror has committed to these terms, so far as
may be reasonably determined by the offeree. While the existence
of the requisite commitment may, in given circumstances, be
reasonably inferred from knowledge of a particular purpose, it is the
commitment, and not the purpose, that is the legally relevant factor.
Unless commitment, reasonably construed, must be taken to be
conditional upon the fulfillment of a purpose, the latter is not an
operative factor at all in contract formation.
The fit between the relational character of the offer and the
objective test does not hold when, as in Fried or Scanlon, the
obligation is understood as self-imposed by the promisor's own act
alone. In determining whether the promisor has manifested the
requisite intention to promise or to give an assurance, it would be
inappropriate, morally speaking, to apply an objective test. To the
contrary, the promisor's actual understanding of his or her own
words and actions as well as his or her actual intentions must count
for something in their own right. One should consider such internal
factors in their internality.
At common law, it is well established that the offer must come
first and the acceptance must be given in response to and after the
offer. It must reasonably appear to the offeree that there is an
actual, subsisting offer to be accepted. Offer and acceptance must be
made in temporal succession. In this way, the parties can bring
about an agreement on definite terms through their interaction
alone, without recourse to any third party. However, though the
offer and acceptance must originatein temporal succession, they
can be construed, paradoxically, as being made at the same time
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at contract formation. Indeed, they must be such in light of the
objective test of formation. Once it has been placed before the
offeree, an unexpired offer is reasonably taken by the offeree to be
presently and continuously made unless or until it is retracted. It is
not as if it is made initially and that is all. For the offer to continue
in time, there is nothing more that the offeror must do. When the
offeree accepts the offer, it follows that the offer and acceptance are
made at the same time. In other words, the fact that they originate
at different times becomes irrelevant. The legal analysis of contract
formation abstracts from any temporal dimension. Being "at the
same time" means here absolutely co-present, such that one side
cannot be what it is apart from the other. This is the so-called
"meeting of the minds" or "common will" of contract formation.
This analysis of the assents that satisfy offer and acceptance fits
with the way the constituent acts of a transfer of ownership are
understood. A transfer of ownership, we saw, is constituted by two
acts of will which are at once temporally successive and co-present;
alienation and appropriation must be temporally successive in their
respective origins if there is to be a transfer consistent with the
rights of the first party. Yet it must also be possible to view the two
acts as co-present, so that appropriation can be of something that is
owned and thus be appropriation via a transfer. The fact that an
offer must be one party's crystallized decision that is capable of
being accepted by a second party means that it is not a mere
expression of intention or wish that is subject to change or development by the offeror, but a present, fixed choice that stands to be
completed by another's identical decision. To complete the offer, the
acceptance must meet it as a second crystallized, present decision,
indistinguishable from the first insofar as both must state the very
same terms. Moreover, these mutually related decisions count as
offer and acceptance only if they are both temporally successive
and absolutely co-present. The fact that the decisions are expressed
in the form of future-oriented promises does not conflict with their
character as present, fully crystallized decisions, as distinguished
from mere expressions of future intention or wishes. Rather, the
future-orientation of promises permits these present decisions to
continue in time, thereby making possible the crucial differentiation
between contract formation and performance. In sum, the requirement of offer and acceptance seems to specify the parties' assents in
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such a way that they can function as two sides of a transfer of
ownership at contract formation and so prior to performance.
The doctrine of offer and acceptance, however, does not completely specify the sort of assents that can fulfill this function. It
specifies at a formal level a certain definite relation between
manifestations of choice (present decisions) that is essential to
contract formation. But it does not say, for example, what must be
offered and accepted or why the parties' mutual assents should be
viewed as transferringownership.Though the formal representation
of the parties' mutual assents is an essential first step toward
elucidating contract agreement as a transfer of ownership, we need
to show next that these assents have a content that is amenable to
this analysis. I shall now try to explain how this might be so by
drawing upon the other main legal doctrine of contract formation:
the requirement of consideration.
The doctrine of consideration, as I will now explain, specifies a
content for the mutual assents of offer and acceptance that brings
out even more fully the two-sided character of contract in a way that
fits with the requirements of a transfer of ownership. It does this by
drawing the familiar contrast between so-called gratuitous promises
and those supported by consideration. The difference between them
is conceptual and intrinsic.
To be enforceable, that is, to give rise to a claim that is protected
by the expectation remedy, a non-formal promise must be supported
by consideration. It is well settled that "consideration" is something
of value in the eye of the law that is requested by the promisor as
quid pro quo for his or her promise and that is either done or
promised by the promisee in return for the promise. When it is said
that the thing that constitutes the consideration must be valuable,
this means just that the substance of the consideration must
either impose a legal detriment upon the promisee or confer a legal
benefit upon the promisor. The doctrine of consideration explicitly
denies any requirement of equivalence between the two sides.
Instead, it ensures that the thing promised and the consideration
for that promise are "qualitatively different": one thing in return for
something else. Consideration is sharply distinguished from motive.
In keeping with this difference, consideration is something that
must "be moving" from the promisee to the promisor, not vice versa,
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as would be the case with motive.71 Whereas the promise must be
made before the consideration is given, as the consideration must be
something requested by the promisor and done or promised in
return for the promise, each side must function as the reason for,
and the inducement of, the other; unless the promise and the
consideration are mutually inducing, 72 the requirement of consideration is not met.
For the purposes of this paper, I wish to focus on just a few of the
main features of the doctrine of consideration. First, let us consider
the structure of a promise for consideration and in particular the
fact that the consideration must move from the promisee as quid pro
quo for the promise.
What is meant by saying that, in legal contemplation, the
consideration must move from the promisee? Negatively, it means
that the consideration cannot be the mere reaction to, or the effect
of, the promise, as this impacts upon the promisee. For example, the
promisee's gratitude or enhanced well-being, even if wanted by the
promisor, cannot be consideration, for these are no more than the
effect of the promise upon the promisee and so do not move from the
promisee. Rather, they are taken in law to move from the promisor.
Nor can the consideration be the promisor's motive or purpose for
making the promise. This also moves from the promisor, not the
promisee. Positively, to move from the promisee, the consideration
must be something that originateswith the promisee and that can
be said to be on the promisee's side, apart from any reference to the
promise. The promisee gives it up in return for the promise.
Something is on the promisee's side if the consideration is under the
promisee's control such that the promisee is in a position to enjoy or
make use of it before the parties ever interact. In this sense, it
belongs to the promisee, not the promisor. When the promisee gives
it up, the law views it as moving from him or her.
This requirement that the consideration moves from the promisee
ensures that, from the start, promise and consideration represent
71. Thomas v. Thomas, [1842] 2 Q.B. 851,859 (Patteson, J.) ("Motive is not the same thing
with consideration. Consideration means something which is of some value in the eye of the
law, moving from the plaintiff: it may be some benefit to the defendant, or some detriment to
the plaintiff; but at all events it must be moving from the plaintiff.").
72. On this point, see Wisconsin & Michigan Railway Co. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386
(1903) (Holmes, J.).
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two sides originating respectively with the two parties, with each of
these sides being initially self-subsisting in relation to the other. By
contrast, in the case of a gratuitous promise, there is just one side:
the promise. Reference to the promisor's motive does not bring into
play a second side, but simply elaborates that single side. Moreover,
the fact that the promisee may "accept" the promise by expressing
delight or satisfaction in reaction to it represents simply the effect
of the promise upon the promisee, and so here again the response is
properly viewed as moving from the promisor, not the promisee.
There is just one side.
The doctrine of consideration requires further that the consideration must be given in response to the promisor's request and as
quid pro quo for the promise. It is not enough that the promisee's act
or promise is reasonably foreseeable to the promisor. It must be
reasonably apparent to the promisee that the promisor has requested the consideration as something that he or she wants in
return for the promise. In light of this requirement, the consideration is viewed as moving from the promisee to the promisor.
In this way, the doctrine specifies a certain kind of relation
between the two sides. Since there are two sides and each "moves"
something to the other, they can be, and are, "mutually inducing."
The reason for the promise is the consideration, and the reason
for the consideration is the promise. Each is the cause of, or the
"motive" for, the other. Unless each side reasonably appears to the
other party as such, any promise will be purely gratuitous. A party's
further purposes or motives for requesting or giving the consideration are irrelevant to the legal analysis. Note that if the promise
and consideration must be mutually inducing, each is at once cause
and effect in relation to the other. Because a cause is temporally
prior to its effect, it follows that each side is at once before and after
the other-in other words, the temporal dimension is of no consequence. Paralleling the analysis of offer and acceptance, the doctrine
of consideration represents the promise and consideration as both
temporally successive (the consideration must be in response to the
promisor's request) and absolutely co-present (promise and consideration must be mutually inducing).
It is well settledthat something can count as consideration if, but
only if, it either imposes a legal detriment upon the promisee or
confers a legal benefit upon the promisor. This further requirement
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is framed, of course, by the previous analysis which represents the
consideration as something requested by the promisor and as
moving from the promisee (whether by a return promise or act) as
quid pro quo for the promise. What more do legal detriment and
benefit entail? The notion of a legal detriment or benefit refers to
the substance of the consideration: the thing done or promised by
the promisee. '" To constitute a legal detriment, the consideration
must, when executed, subtract from something that, in legal
contemplation, is or can be rightfully under the promisee's control
and so something that the promisee can in fact enjoy. This something need not be an external corporeal thing or asset; it can be a
permitted course of conduct, the exercise of a right or privilege, the
use of one's capacities or skills, and so forth. The consideration
imposes a legal detriment if the promisee limits his or her capacity
to do as he or she wishes with the thing. Something is a benefit to
the promisor if, when executed, it adds to what rightfully is or can
be under the promisor's control, allowing the promisor to enjoy the
thing and in this way showing that it is something which the
promisor can actually want. The fact that the consideration may be
a service, the performance of which directly benefits a third party,
does not disqualify it as a legal benefit to the promisor. It simply
specifies the sort of service which is requested and wanted by the
promisor and which is done in fulfillment of his purposes, not those
of the promisee or the third party.7 4
The idea of legal detriment or benefit shows the substance of the
consideration to be negatively or positively related to a party's
wants and to be something in which either party can have an
ownership interest. It refers to the fact that the thing done or
promised as consideration is something usable; it counts as a good
that can reasonably be wanted by the promisee who gives it up and
that can reasonably be wanted by the promisor who requests it.
Being an object of wants in this way makes the substance of the
consideration a thing of value in the eye of the law. As I have
already noted, however, the doctrine of consideration does not make
reference to a quantitative measure of value and so the idea of
73. Williston emphasizes this point. See Samuel Williston, Consideration in Bilateral
Contracts,27 HARV. L. REV. 503 (1914).
74. I develop the implications of this point in Benson, Should White v. Jones Represent
CanadianLaw, supra note 16.
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comparative value between the promise and the consideration is not
any part of the doctrine. Indeed, what the doctrine supposes and
requires is just the qualitative difference between promise and
consideration. The consideration must be something which the
promisor reasonably can want, and it is requested "in return for,"
not as "the equivalent of," the promise. The thing that constitutes
the consideration-a qualitatively distinct, usable something-is
what is wanted as such; it is not wanted as an equivalent. Insofar
as the idea of an exchange necessarily includes the notion of
equivalence, the aim and role of consideration cannot be, then, to
single out exchanges for legal enforcement.
Through the requirement of legal detriment and benefit, the law
specifies a conception of want that is suitably detached from the
parties' particular motives for wanting each other's things. The
question of whether the parties' actual particular interests, whether
ex ante or ex post, are satisfied falls entirely outside the legal
analysis of contract. Moreover, since the object of each party's wants
is simply the thing done or promised by the other side in return for
his or her thing, the conception of wants is framed in terms of their
relation and cannot be understood apart from it. Consideration is
thus something that can be given and wanted by the parties just in
their role as joint participants in a two-sided relation.
This relational conception of wants fits with the idea of the
parties' mutual assents being mutually related, voluntary acts: a
voluntary interaction. Because giving up a good which the promisee
could have used or enjoyed in some other manner is a detriment,
it cannot possibly be viewed just as an expression of satisfaction
with the promise. It moves from the promisee, not the promisor.
Moreover, in giving something up, the promisee does something that
can meet the other party's promise. It is not merely a reaction to the
promise nor the expression of a wish but a deed, no less than the
promise made by the other side. We have seen that the objectively
ascertainable purpose of the deed is to secure the other party's
promise. This is the good that is the reason for incurring the
detriment. Because, in general, voluntary conduct is purposive in
the sense of being directed toward some good, the promisee's deed
is, in this way, voluntary. The same is true of the promise that is
made for the sake of the consideration. And given that the particular features of the consideration or the promise do not matter-what
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counts is just that they each represent something of value-the two
voluntary acts are not only mutually related but also absolutely
coequal and identical.
A promise for consideration is not just a gratuitous promise with
something added to it. It is qualitatively and inherently different.
It differs from a gratuitous promise both in form and content by
virtue of its being intrinsically and thoroughly two-sided. This
marks it as juridical, not merely moral. The doctrine of consideration specifies a conception of object which, being relational, fits
within and fills out the framework established by the doctrine of
offer and acceptance. The two doctrines work in tandem. I have
already suggested how the analysis in terms of offer and acceptance
may be understood as a step toward specifying the constituent acts
of a transfer of ownership at the moment of agreement. What about
the doctrine of consideration?
The idea of a transfer of ownership at contract formation
supposes, first, that it must be possible for a promisee to show
reasonably that he or she is doing something as a participantin the
formation of the obligation,not merely in reaction to the promisor's
already completed assumption of obligation on the basis of his or her
promise alone. The fact that the consideration must be a detriment
to the promisee and that it must move from the promisee ensures,
negatively, that it is irreducible to an expression of satisfaction with
an already completed promise and, positively, that it can function
as a return act that meets the act of the promisor. Moreover, if we
are to construe the relation between these acts as a transfer of
ownership, it must be possible to specify both acts as referring to
things that can be subject to one's rightful control. It is precisely
this kind of act, we saw, that the doctrine of consideration singles
out via the definitions of detriment and benefit, as what must be
requested by the promisor to complete the promise.
What entitles us to view these acts as transferringownership?
Briefly stated, the answer is that they can be so viewed because the
parties themselves, at contract formation, reasonably can understand their acts as having this character. The requirement that the
consideration be requested by the promisor and move from the
promisee, the definitions of legal benefit and detriment, and the
stipulation that the promise and consideration be qualitatively
different, together specify at the most elementary and general level

20071

CONTRACT AS A TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP

1717

a normative relation which is jointly brought into existence by
mutually related acts involving the exercise of ownership. An act
that satisfies the doctrine of consideration may reasonably be
viewed by the other party in these terms. Consequently, the law
may properly hold both parties to this understanding.
While the law does not explicitly present the requirement of
consideration in these terms, this meaning is latent in it. In
contemplation of law, the consideration forms the substance of the
promisor's right that is acquired from the promisee at contract
formation. It is the consideration or its value that is protected by the
expectation remedy as a principle of compensation. Hence, the law
treats it as a protected interest that is given by one party to the
other through their mutual assents. Once the consideration has
moved at contract formation from the promisee to the promisor in
return for the latter's promise, it can no longer be given by the
promisee to the promisor in support of some ulterior promise by the
latter. The law treats the consideration as already in the promisor's
hands, legally speaking, and therefore no longer at the promisee's
disposal to move to the promisor. A transfer is presupposed.
There is a final issue that needs to be addressed as part of our
discussion of consideration. Consideration implies two distinct sides,
two qualitatively different things (constituting the promise and the
consideration), and therefore, supposing a transfer between the
parties, it views each side as both giving something up and acquiring something else. This is clear in the case of mutual promises.
This does not mean, however, that the law is singling out exchanges
for enforcement. While exchanges do involve each side alienating
and acquiring, as well as two distinct objects transferred, it is
important to distinguish between the two-side relation specified
by the requirement of consideration and exchanges proper. Any
transfer of ownership must, I have emphasized, be two-sided. The
juridical definitions of both "exchange" and "gift" reflect this crucial
prerequisite. In this light, we may say abstractly that a transfer of
ownership may be constituted by a transfer of one thing from one
party to another, with the first party alienating and the second
appropriating-this is a "gift"; or, alternatively that a transfer may
be constituted by each party both alienating and appropriating and
therefore each transferring something to the other-in which case
it is an "exchange." In both kinds of transfers, however, the relation
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is, to repeat, constituted by two mutually related act os will. Now

my central contention has been that if the parties are to make
reasonably clear to each other in and through their interaction that
this is what they are unambiguously doing, their interaction must
satisfy the requirements of consideration (or an analogous doctrine).
The essential role of consideration is to ensure that each party can
objectively manifest to the other an assent to terms that makes the
latter's co-equal participation necessary for the completion of itself.
In this way, the doctrine specifies a content that can function as a
transfer of ownership, thereby giving the idea of a transfer of
ownership practical reality. That is why any transfer of ownership
-even the simple one-way transfer from one party to another
which I have termed "gift"-must involve two sides and two things.
At the same time, because the law does not require that the promise
and consideration be equal in value, it allows for transactions that
range from a valuable asset for a nominal consideration to full
blown exchanges of equivalents. In other words, it is possible for an
enforceable agreement to be, in material terms, everything from a
gift to an exchange. But it is crucial that even such "gift" transactions be two-sided in the requisite way, and this means that they
must involve two sides and two things.
For the purposes of this Essay, I hope that this discussion goes
some way toward illustrating how we might draw upon and
interpret the legal doctrines of contract formation to specify the
mutually related acts that can transfer ownership at the moment of
agreement, prior to performance.7 5 I should emphasize that the law
itself does not expressly present these doctrines as specifying the
constituent acts of a transfer of ownership. Nevertheless, I have
tried to show that the idea of a transfer of ownership is latent in the
doctrines and, indeed, that it must be so, if the law is to be internally coherent.
We have seen that the doctrine of consideration specifies a
substantive content that must be promised or done in return for
another's promise if the latter is to be enforceable. The expectation
75. The analysis of the assents that transfer ownership requires, in addition, a discussion
of the principle of unconscionability. For reasons of space, I cannot do this here. However,
elsewhere I have tried to show in some detail how unconscionability, suitably understood, is
essential to the analysis of a transfer of ownership. See Benson, The Unity of Contract Law,
supra note 9, at 184-201.
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remedy ensures that the person to whom the consideration is given
receives it, in the form of damages or specific performance, in
accordance with the contractual terms. The consideration, it seems
then, constitutes the object that is rightfully acquired at contract
formation. To complete my discussion of a contractual transfer of
ownership, I must address and resolve a theoretical disagreement
concerning the character of the object of this transfer. For, as I will
now explain, there are two ostensibly very different views as to how
it is to be understood.
D. What Does a Contract Transfer?
We have seen that, in contrast to in rem ownership rights under
first acquisition, the ownership interest that is transferred at
contract formation is only between the parties. Following general
practice, I will refer to contractual rights as in personam or
personal. To fix ideas further, I shall call in rem ownership rights
property rights. However, as I have already indicated, it is important to underline that, on the view that I am taking, ownership and
property are not the same. Ownership is a more general conception
consisting of any right to exclusive possession, use, or alienation of
something as against another or others. Property is a particular
instance of ownership and more precisely a specific form of acquisition. My fundamental thesis is that contractual rights are also
ownership rights, although in a different way. Whereas property
rights are acquired by a unilateral act of will that requires initial
physical occupancy of an external corporeal object, contract rights
are acquired through the mutually related acts of two parties
without the necessity of any physical occupancy. The question that
I now address is: What exactly is the object that is acquired by
contract? In other words, what is transferred at contract formation,
prior to, and independent of, delivery? We must clarify the meaning
of the personal right in contract. This question is fundamental to
the theory of contract law and to understanding the relationship
between property and contract. I shall discuss two possible answers
that have been put forward in the philosophical literature. Both
approaches take contract to be a transfer of ownership. They differ
as to how they view the object of ownership transferred.
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The first approach, proposed by Kant,"6 holds that the other
party's performance or promise, not the thing promised, is the
substance and object of the ownership that is acquired by a contract.
To illustrate, suppose I am a party to a contract of purchase and
sale of a horse. According to Kant, the object that I acquire by the
contract is not at all the horse. My contract right is not with respect
to the horse. The horse comes under my right of ownership only
upon delivery, and then it becomes the object of my property right.
At contract formation, and therefore prior to delivery, all that I have
acquired is the other's "deed, by which that thing [that is, the horse]
is brought under my control so that I make it mine."" Kant also
expresses this idea by saying that what a party acquires at contract
formation is not the thing promised but the promise itself."8 On this
view, it seems that the relation of rights between the contracting
parties is one thing at contract formation and something different
upon performance.
Kant's answer seems, at first blush, to accord with the legal point
of view in that ordinarily it is said that a contract gives a party "a
right to performance" against the other, who is under a correlative
duty to perform. Moreover, a right to performance can only be
understood as a personal right against the promisor. If a third party
unintentionally damages the thing promised after the contract has
been entered into, but before performance has taken place, the
promisor, not the promisee, has standing to sue for the damage. v9
The promisee can make such a claim only after he or she has taken
possession of the thing via delivery. At that point, the promisee
acquires title and has the same right with respect to the thing as did
the promisor. How can the promisee acquire anything more than a
76. Kant's discussion is in KANT, supra note 52, at 402, 424-26. In a recent important
article, Ernest Weinrib provides a detailed discussion and defense of this view. He argues that
it answers the Fuller and Perdue challenge and that it explains the inaptness of requiring the
disgorgement of gains resulting from contract breach as well as the inappropriateness of
imposing punitive damages for breach. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement
as Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55 (2003). My discussion of this view draws on
both sources.
77. KANT, supra note 52, at 424.
78. Id.
79. The absence of a claim on the part of the promisee is the basis of the economic loss
rule as authoritatively formulated in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v.Flint, 275 U.S. 303
(1927).
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right to performance at contract formation if he or she cannot
rightfully take the thing prior to delivery?
This view seems to be in tension with the settled and fundamental common law principles of contract formation and contract
remedies. It is not the promise itself-as if one could want a promise
as suchom-but rather the substance of the promise-the thing
promised-that constitutes the consideration. The consideration is
either an asset of some kind (including a right, privilege, etc.) or a
service. But both are the thing promised or done, and it is this thing
that makes the promise consideration. Contract remedies, by way
of specific performance or damages, give the plaintiff respectively a
specific thing or the equivalence in money of a thing (whether an
external object or a service). In other words, it is nothing other than
the substance of the consideration that the law awards the plaintiff
by these remedies. In doing this, the law does not, even implicitly,
distinguish between the thing promised and the promise itself.
Moreover, by treating the thing promised as the plaintiffs protected
interest, the law is understood as putting the plaintiff in the
position he or she would have been in upon full performance. In
legal contemplation, then, performance is viewed as giving the
plaintiff no more and no less than the substance of the consideration (and whatever follows from this). Supposing this remedy
to be compensatory, the entitlement to the consideration must be
acquired at contract formation. Consequently, what the plaintiff
rightfully has at formation and what the plaintiff rightfully obtains
upon performance must be the same thing; so far as the relation of
rights between the parties goes, performance does not, and indeed
cannot, add to or in any way modify what is established at contract
formation. This, of course, does not settle the different question of
the plaintiffs rights vis-A-vis others, either at the moment of
agreement or upon performance.
I want to look more closely at Kant's view that the object acquired
at contract formation is not the thing promised but the "promise
itself'-the other party's "choice." What does this mean? To begin,
what one promises must involve an act of some kind (including an
omission to act). One cannot promise a state of affairs that does not
80. On this point, see James Barr Ames, Two Theoriesof Consideration,12 HARV. L. REV.
515 (1899).
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result from or make reference to one's act of some sort. Promising
refers, then, to some exercise of choice. Kant specifies the act that
is involved as one that makes the thing promised available to the
promisee in such a way that the latter is able to bring it under his
or her actual control, thereby making it his or her property. What
the promisee must acquire at contract formation is this act by the
promisor. This means that the decision to do the act is no longer
within the authority and competence of the promisor but rather has
been transferred to, and comes under the authority of, the promisee.
Now this act is specified with respect to a particular thing and, more
precisely, with respect to the promisor's control over it as owner.
Thus the act consists in either giving up something to the control of
the other party or doing a service that has been requested by the
other party. The act must be specified completely and exhaustively
in these terms, and it is the act so specified that is no longer at the
promisor's option but instead is vested with the other party. The
fact that the promisor is no longer free to do as he wishes with the
thing but has already divested himself of this authority in favor of
the other party is inconsistent with the promisor continuing to be
owner, at least to this extent and vis-A-vis the other party. As
between the parties to the contract,the promisor has cancelled his or
her right of ownership by vesting in the other party rightful
possession of his or her act that places the thing under the latter's
control. Correlatively, because this act now belongs to the promisee
and is exercised on his or her behalf, it is the promisee who qualifies
as owner of the thing.8 This conclusion, it must be emphasized,
applies at the point of contract formation. I am arguing, then, that
Kant's view that the object transferred is the promise and not
the thing promised necessarily implies a change of ownership
with respect to the thing as between the parties at formation. The
distinction between promise and thing promised cannot be sustained.8 2
81. Pufendorf seems to endorse a similar line of argument. See 2 PUFENDORF, supra note
1, at 606-10.
82. Kant's argument rests upon the possibility of distinguishing thing and act as two
different kinds of objects of ownership. His contention that the object of contract is an act and
not a thing goes hand in hand with his claim that the object of property is a thing, not an act.
See KANT, supra note 52, at 404, 424-26. It is this dichotomy that I am questioning. In fact,
ownership is always rightful possession, use, or alienation of a thing (which contrasts with
a person and may include services as well as corporeal things). In every case, ownership
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If the foregoing conclusion is accepted, a different conception of
the object of a contractual transfer emerges, one that may be found
in the works of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Hegel, to name the most
important discussions. According to this conception, at contract
formation and therefore prior to delivery, the promisee acquires
a right of ownership with respect to the thing as promised. In
property, the right of ownership is acquired by a person's unilateral
action and the object of the right is defined on this basis. By
contrast, in the case of contract, the right and the object are
completely specified by the terms of the parties' agreement, and this
analysis holds only as between the parties in accordance with those
terms. The right is a non-proprietary right of ownership that is
wholly transactionalas between the parties alone.
This thoroughly transactional conception of the right and of the
object of ownership makes explicit and completes what is latent in
the analysis of property (first acquisition) and a physical transfer.
We saw that first acquisition must admit the possibility of nonphysical, but rightful, possession of the object of ownership, and that
the analysis of acquisition through a physical transfer must allow
the possibility of a transactional expression of mutual assents
independent of and prior to physical delivery. With contract, the
possibility of a wholly transactional construction of acquisition that
is prior to physical delivery is made the explicit ground of ownership. Let me elaborate.
In connection with the appropriation by first acquisition, all its
requirements and features reflect the fact that, being appropriation
of unowned things, it is, and must be, unilateral. From this requirement follow the facts that the object of first acquisition is something
consists in definite modes of conduct that necessarily make reference to a thing. This is as
true of property interests unilaterally acquired by occupancy as it is of contractual interests
acquired through mutual assents. By the principle of first acquisition, I become an owner by
acting in certain ways that are in themselves exercises of ownership, and the content of my
right is simply that this capacity to act as owner with respect to the object belongs to me
alone; when others deal with the object, their actions no longer count as exercises of
ownership. So even in the case of first acquisition, we suppose that the content of ownership
must refer to a certain kind of action, viz. asserting control, and a certain kind of object (a
thing) over which control is asserted. The same is true of contract, except now the requisite
action becomes bilateral and consensual. Every difference between these two forms of
acquisition stems from the fact that one is unilateral whereas the other is transactional. As
I discuss below, infra pp. 1728-29, contract can have as its object services as well as things
(in the narrow sense) because of its transactional character.
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corporeal and separate from persons and that the only way individuals can demonstrate that they have brought something under their
effective control is by occupying it physically. Thus, the time and
manner of occupancy are determined by an individual's unilateral
decision, the ways and means at his or her disposal, the particular
features of the object in the existing circumstances at any given
time, and so forth. Moreover, occupancy requires that persons
actually do something to or with the object. In other words, they can
only appropriate the thing by actually using it. The conceptually
distinct aspects of taking possession and use are initially undifferentiated. And because this appropriation is unilateral, the fact that
the normative meaning of occupancy lies in its relation to others
remains merely implicit.
Acquisition by physical transfer differs to the extent that
occupancy by one person alone is no longer sufficient: acquisition
results from the combined acts of two parties. The unilateral
decision to take possession of an unowned external object becomes
here mutually related decisions to alienate and take physical
possession. Unless the physical movements of giving over and
taking count normatively as alienation and appropriation, ownership is not transferred. The implicitly relational character of
taking possession by occupancy thus becomes explicit in the fact of
these mutually related assents being expressed in the physical
transfer. Yet, in the case of a physical transfer, it is not fully transactional even in its own terms. The time and manner of delivery are
determined by the happenstance of if and when one party unilaterally decides to make the thing available to the other and the latter
unilaterally decides to take it. Although it is the parties' mutually
related assents that allow this happenstance to have legal effect, the
parties do not make this factor the basis of delivery. It is thus only
through physical delivery that their assents have legal effect,
whereas, in reality, it is their assents that give delivery legal
significance. And while here alienation and appropriation are
differentiated by the two sides of the transfer, neither is distinguished from actual use because of the dependence of the transfer
on physical delivery. If the transactional character of a physical
transfer is to be brought out fully, delivery must be explicitly
subordinated to the parties' mutual assents and, in this way, be
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wholly determined transactionally. This is achieved in contractual
relations.
At the moment of agreement and in accordance with its terms,
what one party transfers to the other is the exclusive authority to
exercise control over the thing promised (whether the thing is an
external object or a service).8" This is what the promisor gives up
and what the promisee takes. This exclusive authority to exercise
control over a thing is ownership. Because ownership is the same
however differently it may be exercised, and irrespective of the
different purposes and interests involved in its exercise, the
ownership that is acquired is identical to the ownership that is
given up; hence the propriety of referring to it as a transfer of
ownership. Now, the exercise of ownership, whether appropriating,
using, or alienating, necessarily takes place at a particular time and
in a particular manner. We have already seen how these modalities
are determined in the cases of first acquisition and physical
transfer. In contract, they are determined by the parties' assents, in
keeping with the thoroughly transactional character of the transfer.
Moreover, appropriation and alienation are now each explicitly
distinguished from use. The agreement transfers rightful control
over the thing (object or service) from one party (alienation) to the
other (appropriation), and, by stipulating performance, it determines the time and manner of the promisee's physically taking it
(use).
What is the meaning and role of performance in contract? In
general terms, it ensures that something is made actually available
to the promisee so that he or she can rightfully use it at will. The
moment and manner of delivery are defined exactly and completely
as a stipulated performance in accordance with the basis of rights
(namely, the parties' mutual assents) and therefore in a way that
reflects the primacy of right. It is important to note here that
"delivery" need not require any positive act or service by the
promisor. It may simply involve the promisor refraining from doing
something to the thing. Indeed, the promisee may already have
physical possession of it so that he or she need not do anything more
to take it physically. The content of performance depends entirely
on the terms of the agreement as applied in the particular circum83. I discuss service contracts infra at pp. 1728-29.
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stances. I have tried to emphasize that in the case of a contractual
transfer, as opposed to a physical transfer, delivery does not
alienate ownership. Whether performance consists in a positive act
or an omission, it never represents an exercise of ownership of any
kind by the promisor. The promisor does not act as an owner
precisely because their agreement has already vested ownership in
the promisee. Accordingly, the promisor is prohibited from the
moment of contract formation from doing anything that interferes
with delivery as determined by the agreed-upon terms. It is true
that if the promisor is in physical possession of the thing, the
promisor may do with it as he or she wishes so long as this does not
affect the thing in a way incompatible with the contract's express or
implied terms. Within these parameters, the promisor retains a
liberty, vis-a-vis the promisee, to do as he or she wishes. But this
liberty is not defined apart from the contract. Indeed, the better
view is that the liberty is implicitly authorized by the parties'
agreement and hence is absolutely subordinated to it. It is not
delivery but rather the acts that constitute the agreement that
alienate ownership. In contract, the juridical meaning of delivery is
simply that the promisor has not acted incompatibly with the
promisee's protected interest.' When via delivery the promisee
physically takes the thing promised under the terms of their
agreement, he or she does so already as owner. This is, juridically
speaking, the central point and key to everything.
The right acquired at contract formation is a right of ownership
and therefore includes all the incidents of ownership: the right to
possess, use, and alienate. The fact that these are now trans-

84. Pufendorf states:
For after a pact is completed, or after a right has been transferred by a pact to
another, the thing at once begins to belong to another and to serve his desire,
while the alienator can legitimately commit no act regarding it save such as
tends to give possession to another. If he does anything further touching that
thing before the delivery of possession, he does it de facto and not as though from
any right of possession. Indeed, delivery of possession itself is not, properly
speaking, the final act of dominion, but an abdication of physical retention. For
that is held an act of dominion which is exercised freely from the power of
dominion, while delivery of possession does not take place freely but of necessity,
or because of an obligation ....
PUFENDORF, supra note 1, at 610.
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actionally defined is reflected in the different remedies that are
available to the promisee for breach of contract.
First, breach of contract can injure a promisee's right to possess
the thing as promised, just as trespass infringes proprietary
possession. In both, nominal damages are available to vindicate the
protected interest in sheer possession. Second, contract gives the
promisee a protected interest not just in possession but also in using
the promised thing. This is reflected in the availability of recovery
for so-called consequential loss under the rule in Hadley v.
Baxendale."5 The promisee can recover for loss sustained by not
being able to put the thing to intended uses. But whether and what
the promisee can recover is decided by what the parties could
reasonably have contemplated at the time of contract formation.
Unless the lost use satisfied this criterion, it is contractually
irrelevant. The standpoint is thoroughly transactional. Finally, a
promisee's protected interest in alienating the thing promised is
reflected in the basic remedies of expectation damages and specific
performance. These serve the role of assuring that the promisee
receives the value of the thing promised. Value, for legal purposes,
may be twofold: it may be the value of a commodity or the value of
a unique thing for which there is no substitute. Whether it is one or
the other is decided by the parties' intentions and interests as
manifested in their mutual assents, reasonably interpreted, at
contract formation. One considers their agreement in the particular
context of their interaction. Where it is concluded that the parties
reasonably intended value to be that of a commodity, the remedy is
expectation damages. Specific performance is available to ensure
the promisee receives the value of a unique thing. Here again, the
ownership interest is determined transactionally.
To conclude this discussion about the object of a contractual
transfer of ownership-and with this, my account of contract as a
transfer of ownership-I want briefly to deal with three different
scenarios that might be thought to present difficulties for the
proposed analysis. While my elucidation of the object of a transfer
of ownership may seem at least plausible where the object is a
specified, unique, external (corporeal) thing, this, it may be objected,
is not so where the "object" is a service or something which a party
85. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
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does not yet own, or it is not yet determined at contract formation
which specific thing, among a number of practically identical items,
will be delivered in fulfillment of the contract.' Clearly, any account
of the object of a contractual transfer has to apply to these scenarios. I want to suggest why they do not challenge the proposed
analysis. Showing this will also clarify the meaning and scope of the
object in contract.
My brief answer is that it is precisely in virtue of the
transactional basis and character of a contractual transfer that the
definition of the object can encompass these three scenarios and
more. 87 Let me explain.
In a service contract, one party externalizes his or her powers in
a definite, limited mode and form, and this limited externalized
power is the object transferred to the second party." The first thing
to note is that this is possible only with the first party's consent. The
power that is externalized is part of, and belongs to, the party under
his or her right of personal (physical and psychological) integrity
and so is not immediately something external that can be appropriated by anyone else. This cannot be an object of first acquisition. It
only becomes a possible object of ownership in fully consensual, that
is, transactional, acquisition. Moreover, taken as a whole, these
powers are the person. As a whole, they cannot be alienated without
86. I wish to thank my research assistant, Fredrick Schumann, for identifying, and
pointing me to, these three scenarios as well as for showing why I must explain them. He
provided his own explanation which I found interesting and helpful.
87. In his article, Punishment and Disgorgement as ContractRemedies, supra note 75,
Ernest Weinrib argues that Kant's view precludes disgorgement of gains resulting from
contract breach in all cases, because the basis of this exclusion is the categorical difference
Kant draws between property and contract rights. This unqualified denial of the availability
of gain-based damages is in tension with recent, and widely endorsed, developments in the
common law of contract. For example, where specific performance would be ordered for breach
of a contract of sale of land, courts may compel a defendant who sells the land to a third party
at a higher price to disgorge the gain. Kant's differentiation of property and contract cannot
readily explain this sort of exception to the general rule against disgorgement. In a recent
article, I have tried to show how, on the transactional view proposed here, both the general
rule against disgorgement and these sorts of exceptions can be justified. See Peter Benson,
Disgorgement for Breach of Contract and Corrective Justice: An Analysis in Outline, in
UNDERsTANDING UNJUST ENRICHMENT 311 (Jason W. Neyers, Mitchell McInnes, & Stephen GA.
Pitel eds., 2004).
88. My discussion ofservice contracts draws on Hegel's systematic account which remains,
in my view, the most instructive in the philosophical literature. See, his Philosophy of Right,
supra note 62, paras. 40, 43, 66-67, 80.
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alienating the person himself or herself, which is morally impossible. If they are to be appropriated, they must be externalized in a
qualitatively and quantitatively limited form: a definite work or
service that is now distinct from the totality of the person's powers.
If, as I have supposed, the notion of a thing is understood in legal
normative terms primarily through its contrast with that of a
person, the service is a thing that can be owned by another. Because
the authority to control (possess, use, or alienate) this thing may be
conceived apart from the particular purposes, needs, or interests of
those exercising control, it is the same ownership interest in all its
manifestations. In sum, ownership in a service can be transferred
from one person to another.
Thus there can be service contracts and wage-labor contracts in
addition to contracts for the purchase and sale of a specified
external corporeal thing. The analysis of a contractual transfer of
ownership as set out in this section applies to both in the same way.
At contract formation, one party acquires ownership of the other's
service and through performance obtains actual use of it. To say
that the first party acquires ownership of the other party's service
means simply that the latter has transferred to the former the
authority to determine his or her action or to express his or her
power in the limited way stipulated by their agreement. The second
party no longer has rightful control over this part of his or her
externalized power, which has vested in the first at contract
formation. It is this transferred controlwhich, as always, constitutes
the ownership transferred and which is the protected interest
vindicated by the expectation remedy.8 9
As for the second scenario-where, for example, A contracts with
B to sell B a horse that A does not yet own-the appropriate
analysis depends upon how their agreement should reasonably be
interpreted. One possibility is that the parties reasonably understand that A is promising a horse which he presents in effect as
already his own, whether or not he actually owns it. A has taken on
the entire risk that he may not be able to get the horse with the
consequence that he will not be able to perform as promised. So far
89. Depending upon circumstances, the only available expectation remedy may be
expectation damages if, for reasons of policy, courts decline to order specific performance for
a service contract.
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as the parties' contractual relation goes, A does own the horse. A
second possibility is that the parties reasonably take A to be
promising to procure the horse and, having obtained it, to sell it to
B. A's promise to procure the horse is determined and qualified in
accordance with express and implied terms of their agreement. It
amounts to the promise of a service. The contract does not contemplate that A owns the horse without qualifications or conditions. The
promise to transfer the horse is conditioned by the promise to
procure it. Both elements of the contract-the service and the
sale-come within the scope of a contractual transfer of ownership.
It is the transactional basis of contractual acquisition that explains
how the second scenario fits with the analysis of a transfer of
ownership.
In the third scenario, A has a number of practically identical
items and contracts to sell one of these to B without specifying
which one. According to the transfer of ownership model, A has
transferred ownership over one of these items to B and, as between
the parties, B is now the owner of an item. But which one? Because,
ex hypothesi, any of the items will satisfy the contract, B cannot say
that A's obligation is to hand over a particular one. Nor does A act
inconsistently with the contractual obligation if he sells any
particular item to a third party. Nevertheless, the contract contemplates the transfer of something which is identifiable and determinable. At formation, B acquires ownership of "one of A's items,
having x characteristics and y value." When A hands over one of
these items, he does nothing more than give B physical possession
and use of the very thing promised. A breaches the contract if he is
not willing or able to hand over one of the items. The fact that an
object is not unique does not therefore make it indeterminate and
so unidentifiable. So long as it is possible for the parties reasonably
to determine at the point of contract formation what will count as
performance, they have necessarily specified the object of the
transfer and therefore the thing owned that is alienated by one and
acquired by the other. This extension of the scope of the object is
made possible by the consensual basis of the acquisition. It is not a
possible object of property acquisition (under the principle of first
occupancy). Here again, the transactional character of contractual
acquisition is the deciding factor. Consent, understood as the
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mutual assents that transfer ownership, is the whole foundation of
contract. 90

90. The complete argument for this claim requires that we show how all the significant
doctrines and principles of contract law fit within this conception. That task goes beyond the
purposes of this Essay. For a discussion of the doctrines of mistake and frustration along
these lines, see Benson, Public Basis of Justification,supranote 17, at 326-34.

